The Untenable Case for Chapter 11 by Bradley, Michael & Rosenzweig, Michael
The Untenable Case for Chapter 11"
Michael Bradleyt and Michael Rosenzweigtt
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate bankruptcy law scholars generally view financial distress as an
exogenous development. These scholars see bankruptcy, or "financial distress"
or "insolvency," as a condition created by extrinsic factors that have rendered
the firm unable to meet current obligations to creditors out of liquid assets.
Congress embraced this view in its adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 19781 and, more specifically, determined to push managers of financially
troubled firms toward reorganization rather than liquidation.2 Simply stated,
Congress believed that assets would be more highly valued if utilized in the
industry for which they were designed, rather than scrapped,3 that "it is more
economically efficient to reorganize than liquidate, because it preserves jobs
and assets."4 Put differently, Congress was concerned that liquidations destroy
* Readers of the bankruptcy literature will recognize our indebtedness to Professor Baird for the title
of our Article. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 . LEGAL STUD.
127 (1986).
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1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6179 ("The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry
for which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap."); 123 CONG. REC.
H35,444 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977) (statement of Rep. Rodino) ("For businesses, the bill facilitates organiza-
tion, protecting investments and jobs."); MARTIN J. BIENENSTOcC, BANKRUprcY REORGANIZATION 6-10
(1987).
3. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6179; see also 124
CONG. REc. H32,392 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("The amendment also
encourages business reorganizations by a streamlined new commercial reorganization chapter .... It will
protect the investing public, protect jobs, and help save troubled businesses.").
4. H.R. REP. NO. 595, supra note 2, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6179. Nowhere did
Congress articulate precisely what it meant by "economic efficiency," nor did it rely to any extent on
empirical data in reaching its conclusions. We describe our quite different view regarding the economic
efficiency of bankruptcy reorganizations in Part II, infra.
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valuable firm-specific assets and impose substantial costs on corporate stake-
holders such as security holders, employees, suppliers, customers, and commu-
nities, and therefore concluded that the law must afford managers of financially
troubled companies the preferred alternative of court-supervised reorganization.
In Congress' view, easier access to the protections of Chapter 11 would en-
hance social welfare by preventing the inefficient liquidation of financially
viable firms.
Before Congress' adoption of the 1978 Act, corporate bankruptcy petitions
seeking debtor reorganizations were filed under either Chapter X or Chapter
XI of the Chandler Act.5 Generally speaking, Chapter X was designed for firms
with public debt or equity, while Chapter XI governed the reorganization of
private companies. Chapter X required the appointment of a trustee to manage
the bankrupt firm and assigned to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a significant oversight role to ensure the fairness of the reorganization
plan. Chapter XI left incumbent management in charge of the bankrupt compa-
ny and contemplated no such role for the SEC.
Since managers naturally preferred Chapter XI to Chapter X, there was a
good deal of litigation under the Chandler Act (often initiated by the SEC) over
which chapter was appropriate. It was partly to eliminate this litigation that
Congress in the 1978 Act consolidated Chapters X and XI (as well as Chapter
XII, dealing with real estate reorganizations) into a single chapter, Chapter 11.
Chapter 11 significantly changed the law and practice of corporate reorgani-
zation, making it easier for managers to invoke bankruptcy protection and
strengthening their control of the bankrupt firm. Most notably, Chapter 11 does
not require that a debtor be insolvent in order to qualify for reorganization,6
and it includes a strong presumption favoring retention of management through-
out the reorganization process. Thus, in the ordinary case, a Chapter 11 filing
transforms a corporate debtor into the "debtor-in-possession" and leaves
existing management in control of the firm's resources.7 Congress apparently
believed that a management team already familiar with the company's business
would be more likely to reorganize a troubled firm successfully than would a
newly appointed trustee, particularly since the need for reorganization often
arose from "simple business reverses" that were not management's fault.8
5. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401(a), 92
Stat. 2682 (1978)). For general discussions of Chapters X and XI and the respects in which Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code differs from prior law, see JAMES 3. WHIrE, BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS
281-89 (1985); Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Liquidation and Reorganization, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN
FINANCE 35-20-25 (1983).
6. Compare Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 130(1), 323,423, as amended by 11 U.S.C. §§ 520,723,823
(1971) (requiring insolvency).
7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1104, 1107 (1988).
8. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 232-34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6191-94. Indeed,
the legislative history suggests that Congress was concerned that managers threatened with ouster in favor
of a court-appointed trustee might wait too long to seek reorganization, thereby rendering the less-favored
alternative of liquidation more likely. Id.
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This presumption favoring management's continued control, when com-
bined with other provisions of Chapter 11 affording the corporate debtor
considerable latitude regarding its treatment of creditors,9 effectively gave
managers powerful incentives to pursue bankruptcy reorganization. Managers
are more likely to keep their jobs by reorganizing rather than liquidating their
firm,10 and during reorganization they can operate without the constraints
ordinarily imposed by creditors. As we show below, one result of these incen-
tives has been to increase the endogeneity of the corporate bankruptcy decision.
Even commentators who embrace bankruptcy law's implicit starting
point-that the corporate bankruptcy decision is exogenous-have found much
in the law to criticize. Focusing on the legal rules that govern management's
choice between liquidation and reorganization and measuring those rules against
the quite sensible notion that they should be designed to enhance the likelihood
that corporate resources will be allocated efficiently, many of these scholars
have argued that bankruptcy law is inefficient because it impedes the flow of
corporate assets to higher-valued uses." These commentators argue that exist-
ing law encourages managers (acting in their own interest or in the interest of
the equity holders who elected them) to avoid liquidation in favor of either
court-supervised reorganization or continued operation of the company under
circumstances that invite suboptimal managerial decisions. In the view of these
scholars, debtholders disproportionately bear the risks of continuing a firm's
operations," and managers will always prefer reorganization to liquidation as
a form of bankruptcy protection because reorganization may permit managers
9. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 362(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1991) (providing for automatic stay of creditor claims);
11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (1988) (permitting debtor to sell property free and clear of liens); 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(0
(West. Supp. 1991) (permitting debtor to assume or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases); 11
U.S.C. §§ 542, 543 (1988) (permitting debtor to obtain orders compelling creditors to turn over collateral);
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 545,547,548,549,552,553 (West. Supp. 1991) (affording debtor certain avoiding powers);
11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988) (permitting debtor to abandon burdensome property); 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988)
(permitting debtor to reject collective bargaining agreements); 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1988) (providing debtor
exclusive right to file reorganization plan during first 120 days of case); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c)-(d), 1129
(a)(10), (b) (1988) (permitting debtor to restructure debt and capital structure without unanimous consent
of creditors and shareholders).
10. See supra note 8.
11. See THOMAS H. JACKsON, THE LoGiC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986); Douglas G. Baird,
The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986) [hereinafter Baird, Uneasy
Case]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988);
Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527
(1983); Michelle J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, J. EcON. PERsP., Spring 1989, at 129; see
also Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 173, 182
[hereinafter Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy] (noting identity of interest between managers and equity
holders); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Take-
Overs, 3 BELL J. ECON. MGNIT. SCL 458 (1972) (noting incentives of managers of financially distressed
companies to engage in risky projects).
12. See Stiglitz, supra note 11.
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to effect wealth transfers from creditors (and perhaps other stakeholders) to
equity holders.13
These commentators have offered a variety of proposals for improving the
existing bankruptcy system in one way or another, all of which are aimed at
the deficiencies they perceive in court-supervised corporate reorganizations.
Professor Roe, for example, argues that the law should require courts effectively
to recapitalize "failing" firms by means of a public auction for a new equity
issue.14 Professor Bebchuk proposes that claimants of a reorganized firm be
given a package of stock and options that would effectively preserve the
priorities of their claims during reorganization, irrespective of the firm's
subsequent value.15 Professor Baird and Dean Jackson suggest modifications
designed to preserve the firm-specific value of financially troubled compa-
nies. 16
All of these proposals share a common empirical assertion and a common
perspective. The common assertion is that market-determined prices are better
indicators of value than judicially-determined estimates. The common perspec-
tive is that "financial troubles" or "failures" are exogenous events. Even
Professor Baird, who is perhaps the most skeptical regarding the social benefits
of court-supervised corporate reorganizations, begins his article by stating that
"[a] bankruptcy proceeding is a day of reckoning for all parties with ownership
13. To put this point differently, in Chapter 11 reorganizations managers may be able to avoid rigorous
application of the "absolute priority rule," which is more rigidly applied in a straight liquidation under
Chapter 7. See, e.g., Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority
Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990) (reporting that amounts paid to shareholders of
bankrupt companies in excess of appropriate amounts under absolute priority rule represent 7.6% of total
amount awarded to all claimants). But see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over
Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125
(1990) (arguing insignificance of deviations from absolute priority for large publicly-held corporations);
Myron B. Slovin et al., Bankruptcy Resolution and Priority Rules: Market-Based Evidence From Chapter
11 Filing Announcements (Aug. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (same).
In addition, managers will personally favor reorganization because they are likely to remain in control
while the company continues to operate as debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text. In a liquidation, of course, managers will be dismissed.
14. Roe, supra note 11, at 559-97.
15. Bebchuk, supra note 11, at 78 1-97. According to Professor Bebchuk's proposal, groups of investors
with differing claims would each be awarded a set of option rights prioritized according to the importance
of claims. Id. Each option right would entitle the holder to either (1) full payment of money owed to the
creditor if the company chooses to redeem the right, or (2) the right to purchase one unit of the reorganized
company with an excise tax calculated to reflect the creditor's priority (the lower the priority, the higher
the tax). Id. at 785-88. Under this system, participants would not be able to claim that those below in priority
have received too much. Id. at 792-93.
16. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 209-24. Professor Baird suggests that the preservation of a firm's
value may often be achieved more effectively through a"going concern" liquidation than through reorganiza-
tion proceedings. See Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 139-45. The current Bankruptcy Code, however,
discourages going-concern liquidations by awarding different rights to investors depending on whether the
firm is liquidating or reorganizing. Id. at 146. Professor Baird argues that these discrepancies should be
eliminated. Id. at 146-47.
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interests in an insolvent firm."'17 Professor Bebchuk is equally explicit in his
assumption that insolvency is an exogenous state. 18
Different starting points, of course, often lead to different ways of looking
at a problem. Our starting point is quite different from that of others, and as
a result our critique of the law of corporate bankruptcy reorganization is also
somewhat different. While we agree with the assertion that markets are more
efficient than courts in determining values, we disagree with the notion that
"financial distress" or "insolvency" is purely an exogenous event. We therefore
embrace an alternative explanation for the cause of "bankruptcy," an explana-
tion whose public policy implications differ from the implications of both the
congressional view of bankruptcy and the view of other bankruptcy law schol-
ars.
If we think of "financial distress" or "insolvency" as the inability to meet
current obligations to creditors out of liquid assets, then in a real sense, firms
can choose to become "insolvent" by not maintaining a sufficient balance of
such assets. As long as there is a possibility of court-supervised reorganization,
corporate managers have no real incentive to maintain an "adequate" balance.
More fundamentally, fashioning a firm's capital structure obviously involves
certain choices regarding the use of debt financing. To the extent that managers,
influenced by the availability of bankruptcy protection, choose to burden their
firms with "too much" debt or "impossible" debt-payment obligations, financial
distress is hardly an entirely exogenous event. 9 On this view, corporate bank-
ruptcy frequently is significantly endogenous, chosen by, rather than imposed
upon, corporate managers.20
17. Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 127 (emphasis added).
18. Bebchuk, supra note 11, at 775 ("When a corporation becomes insolvent and bankruptcy proceed-
ings are commenced, the corporation is either liquidated or reorganized." (emphasis added)).
19. We find, in fact, that bankrupt firms are generally more highly leveraged under the 1978 Act than
previously. The results of our examination of debt-to-asset ratios of bankrupt firms, reported in the Appendix
in Table A.4, infra, reveal that firms filing bankruptcy petitions in the post-Act environment have substantial-
ly greater long-term debt than their pre-Act counterparts. This finding suggests that management's attitudes
about debt and the possible adverse consequences of excessive leverage have been significantly affected
by the 1978 Act.
20. Later we report empirical findings supporting our claim that the 1978 Act in fact promoted
corporate bankruptcies, prompting managers to begin thinking of a Chapter 11 filing as just another financial
management tool. See infra Part III (discussing data regarding post-1979 Chapter 11 filings). This no-
tion-that Chapter 11, rather than signifying the last gasp of a dying company, is often one of several
alternatives that creative managers consider irrespective of a company's solvency-has been widely
chronicled in the popular press, especially recently. One recent article declared, for example, that "[blank-
ruptey practice has evolved into a major corporate planning tool," and noted that the 1978 Act had
"increased the availability and acceptability of the Chapter 11 alternative" by dropping "negative terms"
and providing that "a debtor company may file for Chapter 11 for any legitimate business purpose, without
showing grounds such as insolvency." Harold L. Kaplan, Bankruptcy as a Corporate Management Tool,
A.B.A. L, Jan. 1, 1987, at 64, 64-65. Another noted that a "new attitude exists... toward the word
'bankruptcy,"' observing that bankruptcy reorganization "is considered a strategy rather than failure" and
that bankruptcy lawyers "now play an integral role in the day-to-day operations of their... business clients,
troubled or not." Gary Taylor, Bankruptcy: No Longer a Dirty Word, NAT'L L.L, Mar. 14, 1988, at 1. The
article concludes by quoting a leading bankruptcy practitioner: "Bankruptcy is a critical and important part
of business, an option now that anyone needs to consider." Id. at 25; see also Kate Ballen, Strategy for the
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Viewing corporate bankruptcy as endogenous in some measure raises
important issues of public policy, some of which have quite interesting empiri-
cal implications. Did the 1978 Act really enhance social welfare by promoting
more efficient asset allocations? Or is Chapter 11 more appropriately viewed
as a mechanism that permits managers to abridge contractual agreements with
creditors and other stakeholders in order to enhance their own welfare? If the
latter view is correct, then Chapter 11 almost certainly reduces social welfare.
In the next two parts we offer our theoretical and empirical analyses of
these two competing hypotheses regarding the social welfare effects of court-
supervised corporate reorganizations. Generally speaking, the theory we develop
regarding such reorganizations derives from the view that the 1978 Act signifi-
cantly changed the law of corporate bankruptcy. More specifically, the features
of corporate bankruptcy law on which our thesis focuses-essentially those
provisions that made it easier to seek reorganization and encouraged managers
to do so-were prominently considered by Congress in the discussion leading
to adoption of the 1978 Act and then conspicuously incorporated into Chapter
11. Accordingly, the changes in the law of bankruptcy reorganization effected
by the 1978 Act provide us with an indirect means of testing empirically the
validity of our views, which we attempt to do in Part I. By studying findings
from corporate bankruptcies before and after the effective date of the 1978 Act,
we can indirectly determine whether empirical evidence supports or refutes
certain suppositions. Thus, if our starting point is correct, one should be able
to observe tangible evidence of the increased endogeneity of the corporate
bankruptcy decision following the effective date of the 1978 Act. Similarly, if,
as Congress hoped, the Act enhanced social welfare by making it easier for
managers to preserve valuable corporate assets, then the security holders of
bankrupt firms should fare better in the post-Act environment than before.
We argue in Part II that existing bankruptcy law fails to provide managers
with appropriate incentives to allocate corporate resources to their highest-
valued uses. We then present, discuss, and interpret our empirical findings in
1990s: Bankruptcy, FORTUNE, Feb. 11, 1991, at 13 ("Filing for protection from creditors under the
bankruptcy code used to be akin to contracting a social disease. Not anymore." The article quotes bankruptcy
practitioner Thomas J. Salerno: "Chapter 11 is no longer an embarrassment. People have watched mega-
companies like Texaco and Manville go in, clean up their balance sheets creatively, and come out whole.");
Lawrence J. DeMaria, Market Place; An Overemphasis on Bankruptcies, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13, 1989, at D8
("Bankruptcy is no longer the worst word on Wall Street. In fact, bankrupt companies are attracting investors
as though Chapter 11 contained a formula for success instead of a description of failure."); G. Heileman
and Its Bondholders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, § 3, at 2 ("Used to be that a bankruptcy filing was a
company's last exit. But these days, it's more like a highway tollbooth."); Stephen Labaton, Bankruptcy
is Better in America, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1990, at D1, D2 ("America has the only legal system that in
a sense actually encourages a company to seek bankruptcy protection long before a full-blown financial
collapse is near, allowing a business to file a Chapter 11 petition even though it is not insolvent.").
Observations such as these plainly confirm the dramatic impact the 1978 Act has had on the thinking
of corporate managers; to think of corporate bankruptcy as a largely exogenous phenomenon is, quite simply,
anachronistic. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
669-96 (1986). But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice,
20 3. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991) (arguing that most managers seek to avoid Chapter 11 reorganizations).
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detail in Part III. In brief, our findings and their implications are as follows.
First, the evidence supports our view that corporate bankruptcy is more endoge-
nous in the post-Act environment. We find that in the wake of the 1978 Act
the frequency of corporate bankruptcy filings has increased dramatically, the
relationship between the number of bankruptcy filings and general economic
conditions has become more attenuated, a smaller fraction of bankrupt firms
are delisted from the major exchanges in the year before their bankruptcy filing
than in the pre-Act period, and bankrupt firms are generally in better financial
condition than firms filing before the 1978 Act.
Second, we find that stockholders of bankrupt firms lose significantly
greater wealth in the post-Act environment than before the Act. Specifically,
we compare the experiences of the stockholders of bankrupt firms before and
after the Act became effective and find that, while stockholders of bankrupt
firms lose significant wealth in both periods, the loss to stockholders is signifi-
cantly greater in the later period. We also find that under the Act, corporate
insiders of such firms sell significantly more of their stockholdings in the two
years surrounding the bankruptcy filing.
Third, we find, just as we do with stockholders, that bondholders of
bankrupt firms also lose significantly more wealth in the post-Act period than
previously. Consistent with this finding, we also observe a dramatic increase
in default premiums on corporate debt under the Act.
In sum, our empirical results indicate that both stockholders and bondhold-
ers of bankrupt firms suffer dramatically greater losses under the 1978 Act than
previously. These results not only challenge the theory of corporate bankruptcy
advanced by proponents of the 1978 Act-that reorganization enhances social
welfare and should therefore be facilitated and promoted-but also raise an
important and intriguing question regarding bankruptcy law and policy: If
stockholders and bondholders, the only corporate stakeholders with readily
measurable claims, are both losers under Chapter 11, then who are the winners?
We believe that, insofar as corporate bankruptcies are concerned, 21 the
principal beneficiaries of Chapter 11 (excluding the legions of lawyers, accoun-
tants and financial advisors who earn substantial fees from bankruptcy reorgani-
zations) are corporate managers. Chapter 11, in other words, may be seen as
a kind of management defensive tactic against corporate debtholders which, like
certain antitakeover defensive measures,' enhances management's wealth at
21. Chapter 11, of course, is available to individual sole proprietors and partnerships, as well as
corporations. Our analysis throughout is limited to corporate bankruptcies.
22. See, e.g., James S. Ang & Alan L. Tucker, The Shareholder Wealth Effects of Corporate Greenmail,
11 J. FIN. R.S. 265 (1988); Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Dual-Class Recapitalizations as
Antitakeover Mechanisms: The Recent Evidence, 20 J. FIN. EcON. 129 (1988); Gregg A. Jarrell et al, The
Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, J ECON. PERSP., 'Winter 1988, at 49,
58-65; John Pound, The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity: Some Direct Evidence,
30 J.L. & ECON. 353 (1987); Michael Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 110 (1986); Michael
D. Ryngaert, Firm Valuation, Takeover Defenses, and the Delaware Supreme Court, FIN. MGMT., Autumn
1989, at 20; Michael D. Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN.
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the expense of corporate security holders. Chapter 11, like many takeover
defensive measures, is justified by its supporters as a mechanism to preserve
and protect valuable corporate assets. And as is the case with many takeover
defenses, the data show that Chapter 11 preserves and protects the jobs of
corporate managers, not corporate assets.
In Part IV, we offer a proposal for reforming the law of corporate bankrupt-
cy to address the problems that we have identified. Our proposal, which
recognizes both the ineffiencies on which we elaborate in Part II and the
increased endogeneity of the Chapter 11 decision, is quite simply to repeal
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (insofar as it pertains to corporations) and
thereby abolish court-supervised corporate reorganizations, effectively reassign-
ing a "failing" firm's property rights to those with the best incentive to allocate
the firm's resources efficiently. This proposal, in a sense, may be viewed as
the extreme version of a "market-based" solution to corporate bankruptcy.
Under our proposal, firms would never reach a state of "insolvency";
obligations owed to creditors would be financed through the sale of new
residual claims, and if such claims could not be sold, the firm's residual
claimants would relinquish their claims to the firm's net cash flows. In such
a regime, there would never come a day of reckoning when all claims to the
corporation would have to be valued and cashed out. This reform, we argue,
would improve the efficiency of the corporate bankruptcy system while signifi-
cantly reducing the deadweight costs of bankruptcy itself.3
II. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COURT-SUPERVISED CORPORATE
REORGANIZATIONS
A. Overview
By and large, the economic critique of corporate bankruptcy reorganization
parallels that developed by legal scholars34 Most economists examine corpo-
rate bankruptcy from the perspective of a bankruptcy judge, who is confronted
with the choice of either liquidating the firm to pay its creditors or reorganizing
it while scaling back creditor claims and (usually) leaving the firm's managers
ECON. 377 (1988); Office of the Chief Economist, S.E.C., The Wealth Effects of Poison Pills on the Wealth
of Target Shareholders (Oct. 23, 1986) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). See generally David
P. Baron, Tender Offers and Management Resistance, 38 J. FIN. 331 (1983); Michael Bradley et aL, The
Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1983); Frank
J. Fabozzi et al., A Note on Unsuccessful Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns, 43 J. FIN. 1275 (1988);
John Pound, Takeover Defeats Hurt Stockholders: A Reply to the Kidder Peabody Study, 4 MIDLAND CORP.
FIN. J. 33 (1986).
23. The deadweight costs of bankruptcy are the costs of the reorganization process, including the costs
of judicial resources and legal, accounting, and financial advisory fees.
24. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11. This is not surprising since, as we argue, voluntary corporate
bankruptcy is often more appropriately viewed as a legal, rather than an economic, event.
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in control. We refer to the choice between liquidation and reorganization as the
Chapter 11 dilemma.15
The economic analysis of the Chapter 11 dilemma treats the firm's financial
condition as having been determined by some prior exogenous event(s). This
view of the Chapter 11 dilemma embraces the "day of reckoning" notion that
is so pervasive in the legal literature.26 Viewing the Chapter 11 dilemma in
this setting, economists typically weigh the consequences of liquidating a firm
that has greater value as a going concern against the possibility that reorganiza-
tion may permit managers to make suboptimal managerial decisions.27 The
public policy implication of this analysis is that legal rules should be designed
to minimize the social costs of these two welfare-reducing actions.
The related literature in financial economics has expanded this inquiry to
consider welfare-reducing activities that managers of a financially troubled firm
undertake in order to expropriate wealth from the firm's stakeholders.' This
literature focuses on the conflicts of interest that naturally arise in resolving the
Chapter 11 dilemma: the conflict between managers and security holders and
the conflicts among different classes of security holders. Typically, this litera-
ture assumes that the firm's management is an efficient agent for the firm's
stockholders, using its control of the firm to protect stockholder interests.
Consequently, the discussion generally centers on the conflict between stock-
holders and bondholders.
Our empirical findings regarding the impact of bankruptcy reorganization
on stockholder wealth, which we present in Part III, suggest that, in fact,
managers are not efficient agents of stockholders in Chapter 11 proceedings.
If, however, we view corporate management as the ultimate residual claimant,
which it arguably is in a Chapter 11 proceeding, then the analysis of the
management/bondholder conflict in the financial economics literature is never-
theless quite pertinent to our finding suggesting a management/security holder
clash in Chapter 11. That is, while financial economists may have mis-specified
the conflict that in fact arises in corporate bankruptcy reorganizations, the
25. Thus far in our discussion, and again later in Part III, we are careful to refer to Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, rather than the broader phenomenon of court-supervised reorganization, where we wish
to make particular points comparing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 with prior law. The remainder
of our discussion in this part deals generically with court-supervised reorganizations, which under existing
law are of course the province of Chapter 11. Since this discussion does not require that we distinguish
between existing and prior law, and since "Chapter 11" is generally thought of as synonymous with "court-
supervised reorganization" in the current bankruptcy law regime, in this part we will use the terms more
or less interchangeably. Accordingly, references to "Chapter 11" should here be regarded as generalized
references to court-supervised reorganization.
26. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11.
27. See, e.g., White, supra note 11, at 138-39.
28. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 427-
33 (3d ed. 1988); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Management Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 . FIN. ECON. 305, 340 n.52 (1976); Stewart C. Myers, Determi-
nants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977); Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On
Financial Contracting, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979).
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means by which they imagine that managers extract wealth from bondholders
for the benefit of stockholders may well be utilized by managers to expropriate
for themselves the wealth of both bondholders and stockholders. We therefore
draw from that literature in our analysis of the costs of court-supervised
corporate reorganizations.
B. The Costs of Court-Supervised Corporate Reorganizations
The social costs of Chapter 11 proceedings are well known. Bankruptcy
law encourages corporate managers to reorganize their firms under court
supervision, which effectively invites them to create a net equity position for
stockholders by overstating expected net cash flows and understating risk.
While creditors may complain loudly in response, the Chapter 11 presumption
in favor of reposing control of the debtor-in-possession in the hands of pre-
bankruptcy management leaves creditors with too little influence over the
reorganization process to protect themselves adequately against such tenden-
cies.29 The costs of these suboptimal managerial decisions are a major compo-
nent of the social costs of court-supervised corporate reorganizations.
Students of financial economics have long recognized the incentives of
corporate managers (equity holders) to effect wealth transfers from bondholders
by embracing value-decreasing operating strategies." Professors Jensen and
Meckling refer to the reduction in social welfare created by such wealth
transfers as the "agency costs of debt."31 Professors Brealey and Myers label
these the "costs of financial distress."32 And Professors Smith and Warner
attribute these costs to "asset substitution" (i.e., the substitution of risky for safe
assets) and the problem of "underinvestment."33 These costs largely result
from one of two suboptimal managerial decisions: the acceptance of negative
net present value projects or the rejection of positive net present value projects.
In either case, social welfare is compromised.
Under certain circumstances corporate managers, assumed to be acting on
behalf of equity holders, have an incentive to adopt increasingly risky invest-
ment/production strategies, leading, at the extreme, to the adoption of strategies
having a negative net present value. Thus, the equity of a leveraged firm may
be viewed as a call option whose value, other things being equal, increases with
variability (risk).4 The underinvestment problem arises when equity holders
29. See, e.g., Laurence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation ofPriority Claims,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 291-92 (1990) (noting restrictions on creditors in reorganization process); see also
supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, supra note 11, at 184-86.
31. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 28, at 333.
32. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 28, at 421-31.
33. Smith & Warner, supra note 28, at 118-19.
34. See infra note 89. Of course, with greater variability there is also a greater probability that the
option will expire "out of the money." But since the value of the option cannot fall below zero, the net
effect of an increase in variability is an increase in the value of the option.
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reject positive net present value projects simply because the benefits of such
projects would accrue exclusively to the firm's bondholders.35
If we think of "default" as the act by which equity holders relinquish all
claims to their firm's net cash flow, it is clear that equity holders have an
incentive to generate the social costs discussed above only when they perceive
that the firm is near default. Accordingly, we refer to these costs as "near-
default" costs, by which we mean the social costs generated by suboptimal
operating strategies that cause wealth transfers from bondholders and other
corporate stakeholders and, ultimately, reduce social welfare. 6
C. The Perfect Markets Solution to the Chapter 11 Dilemma
Clearly the Chapter 11 dilemma evaporates in a world of perfect markets.
If the capital market is perfect, and property rights are well defined, then the
market value of a firm's securities will precisely and accurately reflect the
discounted net cash flows of its current and future investment/production
decisions. Under such conditions, a creditor can easily write (and enforce) a
contract with the debtor that permits the creditor to invoke default remedies
should the firm's value fall below the face value of its debt. As long as the
value of the firm exceeds the face value of the debt, equity holders can always
issue additional equity to forestall default. If the firm's market value were to
fall below that amount, bondholders could step in, take control of the firm, and
then sell it to capital market participants. This "perfect markets solution" thus
obviates the need for judicial intervention in the affairs of financially troubled
corporations. The only role for courts would be their traditional function of
enforcing property rights and contracts.
In this hypothetical world of perfect markets, valuable firm-specific capital
could never be destroyed. If there were firm-specific assets with value in excess
of the next-best alternative allocation, which might be piecemeal liquidation,
the firm could raise money by issuing claims (securities) and thereby retain
control of these assets. (This argument presumes the existence of an efficient,
well-functioning market for corporate control.37 Thus, if the highest-valued
allocation of the firm's assets involves a change in control, by assumption
appropriate agents would emerge to effect the necessary management
change."8)
35. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 901, 920-21
(1986) (analyzing problem of perverse underincentives to invest).
36. We may think of "bankruptcy costs" as the sum of these near-default costs and the deadweight
costs of the bankruptcy process itself. See supra note 23.
37. See generally Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) (reviewing empirical studies of market for corporate control).
38. In such an environment, with the courts' role limited to the enforcement of property rights and
contracts, the relevant property right is the right to control the allocation of the firm's assets by accumulating
a controlling interest in its outstanding equity shares.
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From the opposite perspective, the only way in which firm-specific assets
may be lost is if the firm is unable to convince the capital market of its true
(higher) intrinsic value, which is an impossibility in a perfect-markets environ-
ment. Only then would there perhaps be an economic justification for a court
to intervene and force a reorganization of the firm's capital structure, although
even in a world of imperfect markets, it seems doubtful that courts have a
comparative advantage over capital market agents in determining the intrinsic
value of corporations and their equity claims.
Of course, the perfect markets solution that we posit is hardly a new theory,
nor does it represent a unique application of standard principles of financial
economics. It is, indeed, the foundation of most of the principles that comprise
the Modern Theory of Finance, including the celebrated Modigliani and Miller
Irrelevance Propositions.39 The relevance or applicability of the perfect mar-
kets solution to the real world depends on the efficiency of the pertinent real-
world markets. Specifically, if the labor market, the capital market, the market
for information, and the market for corporate control are efficient, then there
is no economic justification for judicial interference in the contractual relation-
ship between corporate creditors and debtors. Judicial intervention is warranted
only if there are significant information asymmetries, transactions costs, or
ambiguous property rights."
We now attempt to test certain empirical implications of the foregoing
theoretical analysis. As we demonstrate in Part III, and as our discussion here
would predict, the current corporate bankruptcy regime is indeed difficult to
justify economically.
III. AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY INTo THE SOCIAL COSTS OF COURT-
SUPERVISED CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
ECONOMIc EFFECrS OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
A. Overview
As we discussed in Part I, the 1978 Act made it significantly easier for
firms to obtain court protection from creditors. Indeed, to many of its propo-
nents, a principal purpose of the legislation was to curtail the inefficient
liquidation of viable corporations and thereby preserve jobs and valuable firm-
specific assets. Implicitly, the Act's proponents must also have believed that
the benefits inherent in preserving such assets generally exceed the costs
engendered by court-supervised reorganizations.
39. See Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory
of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261 (1958).
40. But see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.. 729, 733 (1992) (questioning ability of courts to create efficient legal rules
when transactions costs and asymmetric information exist).
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If these proponents were correct, or alternatively, if the 1978 Act improved
the efficiency of the reorganization process, we would expect to observe relative
wealth increases for both bondholders and stockholders under the 1978 Act.
Thus, by comparing the experiences of security holders of firms in bankruptcy
reorganization before and after the 1978 Act became effective, we can draw
certain inferences regarding the welfare effects of court-supervised reorganiza-
tions. 41 In this way, we can examine empirically the validity of the theoretical
analysis of court-supervised reorganizations that we offered in Part II.
In this part, we attempt to measure empirically the social costs of the 1978
Act by examining the economic effects of that legislation. Our analysis pro-
ceeds in three stages, each of which compares data from two periods, pre-1980
and post-1979. 42 We first examine the frequency of voluntary corporate bank-
ruptcy filings before and after the Act to test our hypothesis that the Act made
it easier to secure bankruptcy protection. Next we try to gauge the extent to
which the financial conditions of bankrupt firms differ in the two periods,
investigating whether, as our analysis suggests, the relaxed standards of the Act
afforded to financially stronger firms the advantages of court-supervised
reorganization. Finally, we examine directly (through several empirical tests)
the experiences of security holders of firms filing bankruptcy petitions in the
two periods, which allows us to determine whether bondholders and stockhold-
ers of bankrupt firms have fared better under the Act.
Table 1 summarizes our empirical design. In Equation (1) of our Empirical
Model, we define the market value of the financial claims of a firm that is
about to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition (V) as the difference between the
value of the firm's potential earnings (E) and the costs of bankruptcy reorgani-
41. Some might argue that we should focus our attention on the point in time at which it became clear
that the 1978 Act was going to be adopted. However, apart from the difficulty of identifying that point, there
is reason to suspect that the Act had an imperceptible effect on the relative value of corporate debt and
equity around the time the legislation was debated and ultimately passed. As we report below, filing a
bankruptcy petition is an extreme rarity for firms listed on the major stock exchanges. See infra Table 2;
text accompanying note 50. Consequently, the announcement of a bankruptcy filing (or the ripening of
conditions that ultimately lead to one) is generally a "surprise" to the market. As a result, the only
measurable effect of the 1978 Act would occur after a firm had been identified as one that is going to file
a Chapter 11 petition. Put differently, the impact of the Act can only be measured by examining the value
of the securities of firms that have a nontrivial probability of filing under Chapter 11. The only sample that
is certain to have this characteristic is the sample of firms that actually filed a Chapter 11 petition.
We do find evidence of a structural shift in the default premium on corporate debt around the time
the 1978 Act was being debated. See infra Table 7. Our measure of this shift is the significant increase in
the yield differential between long-term government bonds and a portfolio of corporate debt rated Baa. One
can argue, therefore, in view of the observation in the preceding paragraph, that firms with outstanding debt
rated Baa have a nontrivial probability of filing under Chapter 11 in the not-too-distant future.
42. Although the 1978 Act became effective on October 1, 1979, for convenience we treat January
1, 1980 as the Act's effective date. See infra note 48. Accordingly, we examine the effects of the Act's
adoption by comparing data from two periods, pre-1980 and post-1979. Under the old Chandler Act,
corporate bankruptcy petitions seeking debtor reorganizations were filed under either Chapter X or Chapter)a. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Accordingly, for years prior to 1980, our data include filings
under both such chapters. Post-1979 data, of course, include only filings under Chapter 11, which in the
1978 Act consolidated old Chapters X and X. Throughout this part, we refer to pre-1980 Chapter X and
Chapter XI filings, and post-1979 Chapter 11 filings, as "bankruptcy petitions" or "bankruptcy filings."
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zation (C). (Recall that we previously defined the costs of bankruptcy reorgani-
zation as the sum of near-default costs and the deadweight costs of bankruptcy
itself.43) Equation (2) isolates those bankruptcy costs (C), and Equation (3)
defines the total (social) costs of bankruptcy reorganization (7) as the product
of such costs and the frequency of bankruptcy filings (F). Equation (4) simply
restates Equation (3) with the appropriate substitution of E-V for C, from
Equation (2). Finally, Equation (5) introduces a difference operator (A), which
represents the change in value of the indicated variable from the pre-Act to the
post-Act period.
TABLE 1. Empirical Design
Definitions
V = Market Value of Financial Claims
E = Earnings Potential
C = Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy
F = Filing Frequency
T = Total (Social) Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy





T = F * [E- V] (4)
AT = AF * [E - VI + F * [AE - AV] (5)
Equation (5) succinctly describes our empirical exercise, in that it reflects
the impact of the 1978 Act on the social costs of corporate bankruptcy reorgani-
zation. Thus, in order to determine whether the Act increased or decreased such
costs, one need only determine whether AT in Equation (5) is positive or
negative. Our empirical tests, by revealing whether each of AF, AE and AV is
positive or negative, are designed to that end."
43. See supra note 36.
44. Obviously, this formulation ignores the effect of the Act on the welfare of other corporate
stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, and communities. In this respect, the scope of our
analysis is of course limited.
While others have persuasively defended the appropriateness of thus limiting an examination of
corporate bankruptcy's social costs, see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHL L. REV. 815 (1987), a word regarding other stakeholders is
perhaps in order.
Effects on stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, and communities are difficult to
measure because (unlike stockholders and bondholders) they do not hold claims that trade in organized
markets. Similarly, as compared with wealth-maximizing stockholders and bondholders, the welfare of some
constituents-communities, for example-is less plausibly gauged by reference to quantitative tests. For
these reasons, our empirical tests address only quantitatively measurable financial claims. See also infra
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Our tests and findings may be summarized as follows. The frequency of
bankruptcy filings has increased significantly since the passage of the 1978 Act.
In other words, we find that AF is positive.
We perform three separate tests to determine whether AE is positive or
negative. First, we look to the relation between the frequency of filing and the
return to the market and find that there is no relation between the two after the
Act, whereas before the Act there was a negative correlation between filings
and the return to the market. Second, we examine the pre-filing earnings of
bankrupt firms and find that firms filing bankruptcy petitions in the post-Act
environment are stronger financially than their pre-Act counterparts. Third, we
analyze delistings of bankrupt firms by the New York and American Stock
Exchanges and find that (1) a decision by an exchange to delist a firm turns
principally on the firm's financial condition, as evidenced by reported earnings
and assets, so that delisting may be seen as a signal of weak financial condition,
and (2) firms that ultimately filed bankruptcy petitions were more likely to be
delisted prior to bankruptcy in the pre-Act period than post-Act. Taken together,
these results suggest that the potential earnings of firms filing bankruptcy
petitions in the post-Act period were significantly greater than those of firms
filing in the earlier period (i.e., that AE is positive)' More generally, under
the 1978 Act, bankruptcy filings apparently are less a function of exogenous
economic factors and more a function of firm-specific factors, such as manage-
ment discretion, than during the pre-Act era.
To determine whether AV in Equation (5) is positive or negative, we
directly examine the effect of the Act on security holder wealth. We find that
both bondholders and stockholders have suffered significantly greater losses
in the post-Act environment. We also find that bond ratings of firms about to
file bankruptcy petitions are significantly lower and that default premiums on
the debt of such firms are significantly higher in the post-Act period. Finally,
we find that post-Act insiders sell significantly more of their holdings than do
their pre-Act counterparts in the two years surrounding the filing of a bankrupt-
cy petition. These results, taken together, suggest that AV is negative.
In sum, in terms of Equation (5), our empirical tests and findings show that
in the post-Act environment the frequency of bankruptcy filings has increased
(AF > 0), the potential earnings of filing firms have increased (AE > 0), and
the market value of the financial claims of filing firms has decreased (AV <
note 108 (discussing impact of our proposal on stakeholders other than stockholders and bondholders).
45. We recognize the irony, if not the error, of relying on accounting numbers instead of market values
to assess a firm's earnings potential. But in the instant case, market values reflect too much information.
As Equation (1) illustrates, the market value of the securities of a firm approaching bankruptcy will reflect
both the firm's (reduced) earnings potential and the bankruptcy costs that the firm is about to incur. Clearly,
whether one can say anything meaningful about the social costs of the 1978 Act (AT) depends upon whether
one can separate a change in bankruptcy costs (AC) from a change in a filing firm's underlying financial
condition (A-). We focus on accounting numbers, rather than market values, in an effort to achieve that
separation.
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0). We therefore conclude that the social costs of bankruptcy (AY) have
increased under the 1978 Act. Our empirical findings, in other words, cast
strong doubt on the proposition that the more liberal use of bankruptcy reorga-
nization occasioned by the Act has enhanced social welfare by preserving firm-
specific capital and security holder wealth. We now turn to a detailed discussion
of our findings.
B. Data Description
We performed empirical tests on two distinct data sets. The first, obtained
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, comprises the total
number of United States corporations filing bankruptcy petitions each year from
1962 through 1989.46 Due to the source, these data probably represent the
universe of such firms.
The second data set consists of all firms that: (1) were listed on either the
New York or American Stock Exchange (the NYSE or the AMEX) at some
point between 1964 and 1989; and (2) filed a bankruptcy petition during the
same period.4 7 The primary source for this information is The Wall Street
Journal Index.
C. The Time Series of Bankruptcy Filings
Our analysis in Part I suggests that the number of bankruptcy filings should
have increased under the 1978 Act. Our empirical findings are consistent with
this prediction.
The time series of the number of United States firms filing bankruptcy
petitions between 1962 and 1989 is plotted in Figure 1. This series reveals a
dramatic increase in the frequency of filings after the 1978 Act became effec-
tive. In the 1960's annual filings averaged approximately 1,000. In the 1970's
the number jumped to approximately 2,500, and in the 1980's the average
number of filings was more than 17,000 per year. s Clearly, the post-Act era
is characterized by a significant increase in the number of U.S. corporations
filing bankruptcy petitions.
46. See supra note 42.
47. Our sample does not include firms that filed a petition before being listed, but does include firms
that filed a petition after being delisted from the exchange.
48. See infra Table 2. Note that these data represent filings based on a July to June calendar year. Also,
because of the presumed lag in implementing the provisions of the 1978 Act, our empirical analyses focus
on filings before 1980 and those after 1979. Thus, although the legislation was adopted in 1978 and became
effective on October 1, 1979, we conduct our tests and present our results by comparing the pre-1980 and
post-1979 eras. See supra note 42.
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We summarize the time series of total bankruptcy filings in Table 2, where
we also report the number of firms listed on the New York and American Stock
Exchanges and the number of these listed firms that filed bankruptcy petitions
in our pre-Act and post-Act time periods. We also report the data by the three
decades covered in our study.4 9




TIME PEIOD FILms TOTAL FILINGS PERCENT REIURN
Pre-Act (1964-79) 1,783 2,390 10.10 0.393 20.96
Post-Act (1980-89) 17,321 2,387 16.20 0.685 25.97
Diffeaence 15,538 3 6.10 0.292 5.01
t-statistic 7.71 0.05 2.20 2.56 0.39
1964-69 995 2,153 1.50 0.068 26.43
1970-79 2,413 2,581 15.20 0.588 17.75
1980-89 17,321 2,387 16.20 0.685 25.97
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the data reported in Table 2 is how few
listed firms filed petitions. Over the ten-year period 1980-1989, the average
number of firms listed annually on the NYSE and AMEX was 2,387.50 Over
the same period, there were only 162 listed firms that filed Chapter 11 petitions.
This translates into slightly more than sixteen per year, or less than one percent
49. We report the annual frequencies of these series in the Appendix in Table A.1, infra.
50. More precisely, the number of firms that were traded on the NYSE and AMEX at the end of June
in the indicated year is reported.
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of the total number of firms listed. The filing of a bankruptcy petition is plainly
a rare event for a NYSE or AMEX firm, even in the post-Act environment.
Unlike the time series of total bankruptcy filings, the series for listed firms
displays no dramatic jump after 1979. However, the average number of filings
for listed firms does increase from ten per year before 1979 to more than
sixteen in the ten years thereafter,51 and this difference is statistically significant.52
51. It should be noted that the difference between the two periods for listed firms is the result of the
extremely low frequency of bankruptcies of such firms in the 1960's. As reported at the bottom of Table
2, there were only 1.5 bankruptcies per year for listed firms in the period 1964 through 1969. Thus, while
the number of bankruptcies of listed firms in the 1980's exceeded the number in the 1970's, this difference
is not statistically significant. This observation, of course, does not diminish the significance of our findings
regarding the overall frequency of bankruptcy filings.
52. Throughout this part we report the results of various empirical tests and indicate whether these
results are "statistically significant." For those readers who are not familiar with statistical hypothesis testing,
we offer the following, oversimplified explanation. A more complete discussion of hypothesis testing can
be found in JAN KAMENTA, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMgmrcs (1971).
Hypothesis testing involves the use of sample test statistics to make inferences regarding underlying
population parameters. If we had data on all firms that ever filed Chapter 11 petitions (the so-called
population), we could simply observe the data of interest to us and draw appropriate conclusions, without
having to rely on statistical inferences. Since it is usually impossible to gather data on an entire population,
however, we must generally rely on inferences that are based on sample statistics. For example, we have
collected data on the security returns to a sample of Chapter 11 firms. Based on the values of the various
test statistics that we calculate from the sample, we infer the values of the corresponding population
parameters. Thus, we calculate the mean (average) return to the stockholders of the firms in our sample.
Based on this estimate, and its corresponding t-statistic, we draw some inference regarding the (true) value
of the underlying (population) parameter, which is the true return to the stockholders of all firms filing
Chapter 11 petitions.
Most empirical tests involve the determination of whether a certain estimate, usually a mean or a
difference between two means, is significantly different from zero. In order to make this determination, we
focus on the so-called t-statistic. Formally, a t-statistic is the ratio of an estimate to the standard error of
the estimate. The intuition underlying this ratio is that all estimates necessarily include an estimation error.
Thus, we may calculate a mean to be equal to 5.0 and are interested in whether this mean is significantly
different from zero. Now, of course, if every observation in the sample is exactly equal to 5, then there is
no estimation error the mean is 5, and 5 is greater than 0. In general, however, there will be a distribution
of values across the observations in a sample. Some, approximately half, will be greater than 5, while others,
again approximately half, will be less than 5. The question to be addressed, therefore, given the underlying
distribution or range in the sample values, is whether a mean of 5 is statistically different from zero. The
value of the t-statistic provides guidance in answering this question.
The hypothesis that is being tested is referred to as the null hypothesis, because that implies that there
is no difference between the underlying parameter value and zero. Specifying the alternative hypothesis
depends on the nature of the test and one's prior expectations regarding the true value of the parameter.
If one has no underlying theory or ex ante expectations regarding the value of the parameter being estimated,
then the alternative hypothesis is simply that the true value is not zero. However, if there is some underlying
theory that predicts a particular sign of the value of the population, then one can formulate a stronger
alternative hypothesis.
Most of our empirical tests involve comparisons between the means of a certain variable in the pre-Act
and post-Act samples. Our theoretical analysis guides the specification of the appropriate alternative
hypothesis. For example, our theory predicts that in the post-Act period, the frequency of bankruptcy filings
increased, the financial condition of filing firms improved, and the gains to stockholders decreased.
Specifying the (expected) sign of the underlying parameter value determines the critical value of the t-
statistic, which is the minimum value required to reject the null hypothesis.
As empiricists, we must decide how willing we are to make an error by concluding that an estimate
is different from zero (and therefore rejecting the null hypothesis) when in fact the "true" value is not.
Typically, researchers set the limit of this error at 5%. Put differently, researchers typically place a "95%
confidence interval" around their estimates. The critical value of the t-statistic at this level of confidence
is 1.65. A confidence interval of 99% (setting the limit of estimation error at 1%) would correspond to a
critical t-statistic of 2.33, and a confidence level of 90% would correspond to a critical t-statistic of 1.28.
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The column labeled "% Market Return" in Table 2 reports the average
annual return to the CRSP Equally Weighted Market Portfolio.53 The return
on this portfolio is a measure of average stock performance, similar to the
familiar Dow Jones Industrial Average. Inspection of this series allows us to
determine whether the post-Act increase in bankruptcy filings can be attributed
to a serious downturn in the economy.
The average annual returns to the CRSP portfolio reveal no significant post-
Act reduction in the value of corporate America. In fact, notwithstanding the
enormous increase in bankruptcy filings, post-Act growth in stock values was
greater than in the earlier period. The average of the simple annual returns is
20.96% in the first period and 25.97% in the latter. These data cast serious
doubt on the notion that the post-Act increase in bankruptcy filings may be
attributed to a general deterioration in the financial condition of United States
firms. Indeed, data we now consider show that while the number of bankruptcy
filings is negatively related to the performance of the market in the pre-Act
period, this relation does not hold in the later period.
Tables 3.A and 3.B report the results of a time-series analysis of the
frequency of bankruptcy filings. The dependent variable in the regressions
reported in Table 3.A is the annual number of total filings (Column 1 of Table
A. 1 in the Appendix). The regressions reported in Table 3.B are based on the
number of listed firms filing bankruptcy petitions (Column 5 of Table A.1 in
the Appendix).
The results reported in the first row of Table 3.A show that over the
sixteen-year period 1964-1979, the annual number of bankruptcy filings is
significantly negatively related to the return on the market portfolio in the
previous year. Thus, as might be expected, a poor stock market in one year
leads to an increase in the number of filings the following year. The data
indicate that for every one percent decline in the return to the market portfolio,
there will be approximately thirteen more bankruptcy filings over the next year.
To illustrate, we calculate the sample means of the returns earned by the stockholders of firms filing
bankruptcy petitions in the two periods. Based on these means, we calculate a difference. The null hypothesis
is that the true (underlying) value of this difference is zero. Our alternative hypothesis is that stockholder
returns are significantly lower post-Act than pre-Act, reflecting an increase in bankruptcy costs. Thus, if
the t-statistic of this difference in means is greater than 1.28, 1.65, or 2.33, we can be, respectively, "90%
confident," "95% confident," or "99% confidenf that the true value of the mean is not zero. (Actually,
in classical hypothesis testing, the level of the confidence interval (99%, 95%, or 90%) should be specified
before the sample statistic is calculated.) Observing a t-statistic in excess of these values leads us to reject
the null hypothesis and to conclude that the alternative hypothesis (that the returns are lower for stockholders
in the post-Act period) is correct. If instead the t-statistic were less than 1.28, we could not reject the null
hypothesis.
53. These data come from the University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
This data base includes the daily returns to all firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX since July 1962 and
is the primary source for all empirical work done on common stock returns in the academic literature.
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The regression results also indicate that the number of filings is positively
related to the number of filings in the previous yearY4
TABLE 3.A. Regression of the Annual Number of Bankruptcy Filings on the





NUMBER OF MARKEr YEAR'S
TIM PERIOD YEARS CONSTANT REIMN FULNGs ADJ. R2
1964-79 16 323 -12.80 1.04 0.91
(2.00) (-437) (12.3)
1980-89 10 6230 -22.14 0.74 0.76
(2.57) (-0.72) (5.51)
TABLE 3.B. Regression of the Annual Percent of Listed Firms Filing
Bankruptcy Petitions on the Return to the Market Portfolio and the Percent




NUMBER OF MARKEr OF LISI
TME PERIOD YEARS CONSTART RETURN FIRMS ADJ. R
2
1965-79 15 0.21 -0.003 0.74 0.58
(2.52) (-1.97) (4.46)
1980-89 10 055 -0.001 0.23 -0.21
(1.87) (0.26) (0.62)
The data in the second row of Table 3.A report the results of a time-series
analysis over the post-Act period. Two aspects of these results are noteworthy.
The first is the more than twentyfold increase in the estimated constant as
compared to the estimate over the earlier period. Clearly, the average (annual)
number of bankruptcy filings is significantly higher in the more recent period.
The second noteworthy aspect of these results is the lack of a significant
relation between bankruptcy filings in a given year and the return to the market
in the previous year. Recall that this relation is negative and significant in the
earlier period. The insignificance of this relation suggests that filing a bankrupt-
cy petition in the post-Act period is less a consequence of "financial difficul-
ties" (an exogenous event) than in the earlier period. This result is consistent
with our assertion that a bankruptcy filing is a more endogenous event in the
post-Act Chapter 11 environment.55
54. The adjusted R2 reported in Table 3.A is 0.91 and indicates that 91% of the variation in the number
of filings is "explained" by the regression model.
55. Note the R2 (0.76).
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The data in Table 3.B report the results of identical tests performed on our
sample of listed firms. The results of these tests are remarkably similar to those
for the aggregate data. Thus, in the pre-Act period, the number of listed firms
filing in a given year is negatively related to the market return and positively
related to the annual number of filings in the previous year. These relations are
statistically significant.5 6 As is the case for the aggregate sample, however,
there is no (lagged) relation between the number of filings and the return to
the market in the post-Act period.57 These results further support our claim
regarding the endogeneity of the Chapter 11 decision.
D. The Financial Condition of Firms Filing Bankruptcy Petitions
We just noted that bankruptcy filings are less related to general economic
conditions under the 1978 Act than they were previously. Before 1980, a
downturn in the stock market reliably signaled an increase in bankruptcy filings
in the coming year, while there is no such relation between market conditions
and bankruptcy filings in the post-Act environment. In this section we show,
similarly, that bankrupt firms are significantly stronger financially in the post-
Act environment than previously. Our results suggest that the significant
increase in the frequency of bankruptcy filings under the 1978 Act should not
be attributed to any general deterioration in the financial strength of corporate
America.
1. Returns on Assets
Table 4 reports the mean accounting rate of return on assets (defined as
net income divided by the (book) value of total assets) for the firms in our two
subsamples, as reported on the COMPUSTAT data files.58 For each firm in
our data base that is listed on the COMPUSTAT file, we calculate an abnormal
return on assets (ROA) by subtracting from the firm's ROA the average ROA
on the COMPUSTAT file for the same year.
56. The R2 in this regression indicates that 58% of the variation in the number of filings is explained
by the model.
57. Note that the R2 is actually negative, which indicates that the model is incapable of explaining any
of the variation in the annual number of filings.
58. COMPUSTAT is the most frequently used and comprehensive data base of annual accounting
numbers for large corporations. The data are compiled by Dow Jones & Company, Inc. and are made
available to research institutions in machine-readable form.
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TABLE 4. The Accounting Return on Assets of Firms Filing Bankruptcy Petitions
[Reported is the mean, economy-wide adjusted return on assets (ROA) for firms
in the indicated sample.a The number of firms is reported in brackets [x] and the
t-statistics of the differences are reported in parentheses (x).]

















Net Income Net Income
Total Assets To Assets
Z Net income =
Y Total Assets =
The summation of the Net Income figures for all firms listed
on the COMPUSTAT tape in the relevant year
The summation of the Total Asset figures for all firms listed on
the COMPUSTAT tape in the relevant year
b Compounded Annual ROA
The data reported in Table 4 suggest that bankrupt firms were weaker
financially before the Act than after.59 Thus, while the firms in both periods
realized significantly negative accounting returns, the returns are consistently
lower in the earlier period. In each of the five years before filing, the mean
abnormal return on assets is greater (i.e., less negative) for firms in the post-Act
period, and the difference is statistically significant in three of the five years.
The compound abnormal return from event year -5 through event year -1 is a
significant 6% greater in the post-Act period.6"
59. It is important to note, however, that all of the mean, economy-wide adjusted returns on assets in
Table 4 are significantly less than zero. Thus, as much as five years before filing, firms in both periods
experienced significantly negative abnormal accounting returns.
60. Note that there are only 30 firms in the pre-Act sample that have complete data for the five-year
period and 116 firms with complete data in the latter period. In Table A.2 in the Appendix, infra, we report
and discuss data on the availability of information in the COMPUSTAT files.
Table 4 in the text also shows that in the year of filing and beyond, accounting returns are lower for
firms in the post-Act period. While this seems at first to be inconsistent with our hypothesis that post-Act
bankrupt firms are in relatively better financial condition, we believe that these data reflect management's
actual stewardship of the firm in bankruptcy, rather than the firm's pre-filing earnings potential. As such,
in view of management's incentive to undertake suboptimal investment/production strategies while in











In order to assess further the relative financial conditions of the firms in
the two time periods, we now turn to an examination of the frequency and
timing of stock exchange delistings of firms filing bankruptcy petitions.
2. Delistings by the Major Exchanges
Table 5 reports the timing of delistings by the two exchanges of the shares
of firms that ultimately filed a bankruptcy petition. The data are presented
separately for the two time periods: pre-Act and post-Act. The entries in Row
1 reflect the total number of listed firms filing bankruptcy petitions during the
indicated time period. Row 2 reports the number of firms that were listed at
least 500 trading days (roughly two years) before delisting that filed petitions
before December 31, 1989. Row 3 reports the number of firms delisted more
than one year but less than two years before filing. Row 4 reports the number
of firms delisted more than one week but less than one year before filing.
TABLE 5. The Timing of Delistings of NYSE and AMEX Firms That Filed
Bankruptcy Petitions Between 1964 and 1989
Row DESCRIION PRE-ACr PosT-Act
1. Total number of firms filing bankruptcy petitions and 163 163
previously listed on either the NYSE or AMEX
2. Firms delisted more than two years before filing 20 21
3. Firms delisted more than one year and less than two years 12 4
before filing
4. Firms delisted more than one week and less than one year 64 21
before filing
5. Firms listed one week before filing 67 117
(percent of Row 1) (41) (72)
6. Firms delisted between one week before and two weeks 36 53
after filing (percent of Row 5) (54) (45)
7. Firms listed two weeks after filing 31 64
(percent of Row 1) (19) (30)
The data in Row 2 indicate that approximately the same number of firms
were delisted up to two years (500 trading days) prior to filing in both periods.
However, Rows 3 and 4 show that in the period beginning 499 trading days
before filing, almost three times as many firms were delisted in the pre-Act
period than in the post-Act period (76 versus 25). The data in Row 5 show that
one week before filing, a much higher percentage of firms (72% versus 41%)
were still listed in the later period.
We interpret delisting as a sign of weak financial condition; the major
exchanges generally delist a company's shares when the company falls below
listing criteria that are designed to gauge the financial health of the firm. The
hardly surprising. See supra notes 8, 9; Part II.B; see also text accompanying infra notes 76-77.
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NYSE, for example, can delist a company's shares if the aggregate market
value of shares outstanding (excluding Treasury stock) is less than $8 million
and average net income after taxes for the past three years is less than
$600,000.61 Since the data in Table 5 indicate that firms ultimately filing
bankruptcy petitions were much more likely to be delisted in the pre-Act period,
it follows that bankrupt firms were more clearly financially troubled during that
era. These data therefore lend further support to the view that the decision to
file a bankruptcy petition has become more endogenous under Chapter 11.
Thus far our evidence indicates that there has been a significant increase
in the frequency of bankruptcy filings under the 1978 Act, and that this increase
is not due to a deteriorating economy or an increase in the number of firms that
are in financial distress. These results indicate that after the Act, corporate
bankruptcy became more endogenous and less a function of extrinsic economic
factors.
To put this differently, bankrupt firms are in better financial condition
under the Act than previously. One would expect, as a consequence of this
relative strength, to find evidence that the 1978 Act benefited security holders,
particularly given Congress' avowed purpose of fashioning that legislation to
promote the preservation of valuable firm-specific capital by liberalizing access
to bankruptcy reorganization. 62 We would therefore expect the capital loss
61. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, SECTION 8-SUSPENSION AND
DELISTING, reprinted in N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2560,2565 (Sept. 1989). The American Stock Exchange
explicitly rejects any "precise mathematical formula" for delisting, instead adopting discretionary standards
such as the financial condition of a company appearing "unsatisfactory" or further dealings with the
company being "inadvisable." AMEX COMPANY GUIDE, PART 10-SUSPENSION AND DELISTING, reprinted
in Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 10375-77 (Mar. 1991). Despite these discretionary standards, the AMEX
has adopted certain nonbinding "guidelines" to which it normally will give "consideration" for delisting:
stockholders equity of less than $2 million and operating losses in two of the last three years, stockholders
equity of less than $4 million and operating or net losses in three of the last four years, or operating losses
in each of the last five years. Id.
However, the apparent difference between the NYSE's standard approach and the AMEX's discretion-
ary approach is somewhat misleading. The NYSE does maintain some flexibility regarding delisting. If
management can persuade the exchange that it is working diligently to improve the company's performance,
it is not uncommon for a company's shares to remain listed, even if the company no longer satisfies the
exchange's listing criteria. See. e.g., Diana B. Henriques, The N.YS.E.'s Fluid Standards, N.Y. TIMEs, July
28, 1991, at C15.
While the formal delisting requirements of the NYSE have not changed over the three decades covered
by our study, we should note that the Exchange has modified its post-filing delisting practices. Before 1984,
a bankruptcy filing almost always resulted in delisting. After the Johns Manville bankruptcy filing in 1984,
however, the Exchange revised its practice to allow the continued listing of firms in Chapter 11. See Letter
from George Sofianos, Senior Economist, NYSE, to Michael Bradley (Oct. 1, 1991) (on file with authors).
Sofianos writes:
The wording of the NYSE delisting rules 499 and 500 [has] not changed, but the interpretation
has. For example, the Manville corporation was bankrupt because of large outstanding lawsuit
claims. The NYSE believed that a new agreement with the claimants would occur and Manville
would return to its stature as a healthy company. Because of these unusual circumstances the
NYSE allowed Manville to remain listed even though it had filed for bankruptcy.
Id. This change, of course, has no impact on our pre-filing delisting data or the conclusions derived
therefrom.
62. See supra notes 2-4, 6-9 and accompanying text.
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suffered by security holders of bankrupt firms to be smaller post-Act than pre-
Act.
In the two sections that follow, we examine the effects of bankruptcy
filings on security holder wealth and find that, in fact, security holders of
bankrupt firms have fared significantly worse under the 1978 Act. Despite the
relative financial strength of post-Act bankrupt firms, both stockholders and
bondholders of such firms have experienced significantly greater losses in the
post-Act period. These results, we believe, suggest that the Act has increased
management's freedom to pursue self-interested operating strategies at the
expense of the firm's security holders. The 1978 Act, in other words, has
weakened the ability of creditors to monitor management effectively, allowing
managers more frequently to abandon value-maximizing strategies in favor of
programs that maximize their own welfare.
E. The Effect of Bankruptcy Filings on Stockholder Wealth
In this section we examine the effect of a bankruptcy filing on the wealth
of stockholders. Our analysis is based on the average Abnormal Return (AR)
to the firms in our sample.63 We define the AR to each firm as the compound-





RI,, = return to shares of firm i on day t
R.,, = return to the value-weighted market portfolio on day t
TB = beginning of the holding period
TE = end of the holding period
The AR is essentially the return to the stock of the firm less the return to
the overall market. More specifically, the AR is the net position of a zero-
investment portfolio formed by selling short the value-weighted market portfolio
and investing the proceeds in the shares of the firm under investigation. Thus,
if the AR is zero, then the rate of return to the shares of the firm under investi-
gation was exactly the same as the return to the market. An AR of .25 means
that the firm's shares appreciated 25% more than the market, and an AR of-.25
63. For a general discussion of the use of market-adjusted returns in empirical analyses, see Stephen
3. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Measuring Security Price Performance, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (1980).
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indicates that the return to the market was 25% greater than the return to the
firm's shares over the indicated holding period.
In Table A.3 in the Appendix, we report abnormal stockholder returns for
eleven holding periods (nine pre-filing and two post-filing) ranging from four
years before filing to six months after filing. We find that in eight of the nine
pre-filing holding periods, the abnormal returns for post-Act firms are less than
for pre-Act firms, and in four periods this difference is statistically significant.
Table 6 summarizes the impact of bankruptcy on stockholder wealth and
reveals dramatically the extent to which stockholders have been hurt by the
1978 Act. The sample in Table 6 includes all listed firms that filed a bankrupt-
cy petition. Returns for each firm are calculated from two years before filing
through the earlier of the delisting date or twenty days after filing. As this table
indicates, during the pre-Act era, stockholders of firms filing bankruptcy
petitions lost a little more than $.50 per dollar invested over the stated period.
Since the 1978 Act became effective, they lose on average almost all of their
wealth over the same holding period. In terms of average dollar returns,
stockholders in the latter period suffer a loss almost three times greater than
the loss suffered by stockholders in the earlier period. This translates into a total
loss for listed firms of almost $9 billion in the earlier period and more than $23
billion in the latter period. Thus, in some general sense, the effect of the Act
was to decrease stockholder wealth in listed firms alone by more than $14
billion.
TABLE 6. Mean Abnormal Percentage and Dollar Returns and Total Dollar
Losses to the Stockholders of Firms Filing Bankruptcy Petitions
[Dollar figures are stated in millions in 1989 constant dollars. Holding periods
are from two years before filing to delisting, or 20 days after filing, whichever
occurs first.]
PRE-Acr Posr-Acr DIpERENCE T-srATIsnc
Number of firms 132 135
Percent Return -56.19 -99.30 -43.11 -7.43
Dollar Return -67.15 -171.33 -104.17 -2.35
Total dollar losses for period 8,865.06 23,129.55 14,265.49
As indicated by our empirical design, summarized in Table 1, there are two
possible explanations for the greater losses suffered by stockholders in the later
period. One is that firms that filed bankruptcy petitions in the later period may
have been significantly more financially troubled prior to filing than were
bankrupt firms in the pre-Act period. This interpretation, however, is inconsis-
tent with the results we reported earlier in this part. Recall, first, that more
firms filed petitions in the later period even though the economy grew at a
greater rate than during the earlier period. Second, more firms were delisted
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prior to filing in the earlier period than under the Act. Third, the annual number
of post-Act bankruptcy filings is less closely related to general economic
conditions than is the annual number of pre-Act filings. Finally, bankrupt firms
filing under the 1978 Act reported higher pre-filing net earnings than their pre-
Act counterparts. Given these findings, we conclude that the greater stockholder
losses in the post-Act period do not indicate that bankrupt firms were in worse
shape prior to filing in that period than previously.
We embrace, instead, the second explanation for those greater losses: they
result from the increased bankruptcy costs occasioned by the Act. Thus, we
believe that the lower stockholder returns in the post-Act period reflect the
stock market's expectation that the reorganization process itself will exact
greater losses under the 1978 Act than under prior law. Later we report findings
on the bondholder wealth effects of bankruptcy filings that reflect a similar
expectation in the bond market.64 We argue that these greater losses derive
from management's increased latitude under the 1978 Act to pursue suboptimal
operating strategies during reorganization.
To summarize, stockholders of firms filing bankruptcy petitions realize a
significantly greater loss in the post-Act environment than previously. Even
though firms invoking bankruptcy protection have been financially stronger in
the post-Act era than in the earlier period, stock price declines are steeper in
the later period. Whatever the intentions of Congress in adopting the 1978 Act,
the Act has not enhanced stockholder wealth.65 Having thus demonstrated that
corporate stockholders were not the beneficiaries of that legislation, we turn
to an examination of the bondholder wealth effects of the 1978 Act. As we
discuss below, it appears that bondholders did not benefit from the Act either.
F The Effect of Bankruptcy Filings on Bondholder Wealth
In order to assess the effect of the 1978 Act on the wealth of corporate
bondholders, we perform two empirical tests. First, we test for a change in the
default premium on corporate bonds in the post-Act era. A change from the pre-
Act period in the yields of corporate bonds relative to the yields of risk-free
government bonds would reflect the extent to which the Act altered the mar-
64. See infra Part IILF.2.
65. Our findings regarding the losses realized by the equity holders of bankrupt firms in the pre-1980
period are consistent with those reported by Professors Clark and Weinstein. In a study of firms filing
bankruptcy petitions between June 1938 and September 1979, they documented stockholder losses of
approximately 50% in the three years prior to filing. They also reported losses of 30% in the month of filing.
See Truman A. Clark & Mark L Weinstein, The Behavior of the Common Stock of Bankrupt Firms, 38 3.
FIN. 489 (1983).
Our findings are inconsistent with those reported by Professors Morse and Shaw, who found no
difference in the wealth losses to stockholders before and after the effective date of the 1978 Act. See Dale
Morse & Wayne Shaw, Investing in Bankrupt Firms, 43 3. FIN. 1193 (1988). Their post-Act sample,
however, includes bankruptcy filings only through 1982. We believe our sample to be more representative
of the post-Act losses realized by the stockholders of bankrupt firms.
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ket's assessment of the costs imposed on bondholders by bankruptcy filings.
Second, we examine directly the experiences of bondholders of firms that have
filed bankruptcy petitions.
1. Changes in the Default Premium on Corporate Bonds
Table 7 reports the results of a time-series analysis of the default premiums
on corporate bonds. Following standard finance convention, we define the
default premium as the difference between the yield to low-grade corporate
bonds (rated Baa) and the yield to long-term government bonds. Both bond
portfolios have a twenty-year maturity. The data are taken from the Standard
and Poor's Bond Guide66 and are monthly observations of annualized yields.
The time period under study is from July 1962 through December 1987.
The data in Table 7 report the results of two regressions of the default
premium. In each, the independent variable is a dummy variable that takes on
the value of one if the observation is after January 1978, and zero if the
observation is between July 1962 and December 1977. This formulation
assumes that the implications of the 1978 Act became apparent to market
participants by the beginning of 1978.
TABLE 7. Regression of Default Premium on a Post-1977 Dummy
Variable Over the Period July 1962 to December 1987
(t-statistics are reported in parentheses)
[Default premium equals the yield on Baa corporate bonds minus the yield on
long-term treasuries. Data are monthly observations of annualized yields.]
Posr-1977
ESTIMATION TEHNIQUE CONSTANT DUmmIy DuRBIN-WATwoN
OLSa 1.4223 0.7639
(22.28) (7.49) 0.46
MLE (AR-3)b 1.4810 0.5897 1.99
(9.09) (2.47)
a Ordinary Least Squares estimates.
b Maximum Likelihood estimates (AR-3).
The first line in the table reports Ordinary Least Squares estimates. The
regression results indicate that the default premium is significantly positive in
the first period and that the default premium is significantly greater in the latter
period. However, the low Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that the time series
66. Standard and Poor's Bond Guide is a monthly publication produced by the Standard and Poor's
Corporation.
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of the default premium is highly autoregressive, 6 thus calling into question
the estimated standard errors.
To account for the autoregressive property in the time series of the default
premium, we fit an AR-3 Model68 to the data. The AR-3 model also suggests
that the default premiums are higher under the 1978 Act. This model, however,
is not conclusive due to other statistical factors. 69
The results reported in Table 7 suggest that the default premium on corpo-
rate bonds increased significantly in the wake of the 1978 Act. The point
estimate increased by approximately 40%. This increase in the default premium
is consistent with rational bondholders price-protecting against greater expected
losses in the event of a Chapter 11 filing. It appears that corporate bondholders
did not expect to benefit from the provisions of the Act. As we show in the
next subsection, their expectations were not disappointed.
2. Bondholder Wealth Effects
In this subsection we examine the effect of a bankruptcy filing on the
wealth of corporate bondholders. Out of our total sample of 326 firms, we were
able to find sufficient data on the publicly-traded debt of 88. Several firms had
more than one issue outstanding. In all we have 175 bonds issued by 88 firms.
We collected monthly prices on each issue from Moody's Bond Record"
from twelve months before through six months after the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. We then calculated an Abnormal Return to each bond in a manner
similar to the methodology we employed in examining the wealth effect for
corporate stockholders. In calculating the Abnormal Return to bondholders, we
used the return to Moody's Corporate Bond Index7l as the standard of compar-
ison. Specifically, we substituted the monthly return to this index for the
variable Rm, in Equation (6).
We report our results in Table 8. The data there show that bondholders of
bankrupt firms experience a significant capital loss in both of our periods, just
67. An autoregressive process is one in which the current value of a variable is a function of its past
values. Many macroeconomic time series are autoregressive, especially those relating to interest rates. A
Durbin-Watson of 2.00 indicates zero (first order) autoregression. The Ordinary Least Squares regression
shows a Durbin-Watson statistic of 0.46, which indicates a high level of autoregression.
68. An AR-3 model indicates that the default premium in the current period is statistically related to
the default premiums in the past three periods.
69. While the third-order autoregression model reduces the residuals to white noise, the sum of the
estimates of the three autoregression factors is greater than 1.0. This suggests that the time series of the
default premium is nonstationary. Ifin fact the series is nonstationary, then we cannot ascribe any statistical
significance to the greater default premium in the latter period. For example, if the series is a random walk,
which the data suggest it might be, then the increase in the default premium cannot be ascribed to the 1978
Act. Put differently, with a random walk, virtually anything is possible, which is to say that the process
generating the default premium could have produced a higher level in the latter period irrespective of the
implications of the 1978 Act.
70. Moody's Bond Record is published monthly by Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
71. Moody's Corporate Bond Index is published monthly by Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
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as we found for stockholders. But we also find, again similarly to our findings
regarding stockholder wealth effects, that bondholders suffer significantly
greater losses in the post-Act period than in the earlier period. Indeed, the loss
suffered by bondholders is more than 28 percentage points greater in the later
period. The t-statistic of this difference is -3.69. Like stockholders, corporate
bondholders have not benefited from the adoption of the 1978 Act.72
TABLE 8. Mean Percentage Abnormal Returns to the Bondholders of Firms
Filing Bankruptcy Petitions
[The number of bonds in each sample is reported in brackets [xl.]
HOLDING PERIODa  PRE-Acr POsr-ACr DIlPERTENCE T-STAnSTIC
-11 to -6 -5.05 -18.07 -13.02 -1.89
[56] [92]
-5 to -1 -13-52 -29.62 -16.10 -2.27
[55] [921
0 -23.22 -18.40 4.82 0.95
[52] [921
1 to 6 1.85 -13.64 -15.49 -1.25
[48] [731
-11 to 6b  -42.23 -70.66 -28.43 -3.69
[70] [105]
BOND RATINGc
-12 5.12 6.25 1.13 4.10
[26] [67]
-1 6.31 6.74 0.43 1.63
[36] [70]
a Holding period returns over the indicated months, relative to the month of filing. The month of filing is
holding period 0 in the table.
b Bonds are deleted from this sample if the first price is less than six months before filing or the last
price is before the filing month. In general, the first price is twelve months before filing..
c Each bond is assigned a numerical ranking according to its Moody's Bond Rating one month before
filing. See supra note 72.
72. At the bottom of Table 8, we report the average ratings of the bonds in each sample one year and
one month prior to filing. In order to compare the average ratings of the bonds in the two time periods, we
assign each bond a numerical rating according to its Moody's Bond Rating. The numerical rating ranges
from a high of 1 (Moody's Aaa) to a low of 9 (Moody's C). A numerical rating of 6 corresponds to a
Moody's rating of B.
The results in Table 8 indicate that the bonds in the earlier period were of significantly higher quality
than those in the latter period. This is consistent with the greater losses suffered by bondholders in the latter
period. However, the difference in ratings for the two periods does not suggest that bankrupt firms in the
post-Act period generally issued "junk bonds" while their pre-Act counterparts issued high-quality bonds.
This is consistent with the data reported in Table 4, supra, which indicate that bankrupt firms are financially
stronger (and therefore less likely to have to resort to junk bond financings) post-Act than previously. Thus,
the bond rating data are consistent with our hypothesis that the increased frequency of bankruptcy filings
under the 1978 Act cannot plausibly be attributed to a general deterioration in the financial condition of
U.S. corporations since 1979. See supra Part JII.D.
Chapter 11
G. Insider Trading Activity In Firms Filing Bankruptcy Petitions
We have shown that both stockholders and bondholders of bankrupt firms
suffer greater losses in the post-Act environment. We speculate, as a conse-
quence, that the only beneficiaries of the 1978 Act have been lawyers, bank-
ruptcy consultants (such as accountants and financial advisors) and corporate
managers. In order to test this last claim, we examine the insider trading
activity of firms that file bankruptcy petitions.
Presumably, managers have a comparative advantage in predicting the effect
of a court-supervised reorganization on the value of their firm's securities.
Thus, if the provisions of the Act actually protected the wealth of stockholders,
we would expect to see fewer insider sales since 1979 in the period surrounding
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Alternatively, if we observe insiders selling
their stock in the period around a filing, we can infer that managers expect the
bankruptcy process to have an adverse effect on the value of their firm's equity.
To assess the trading activity of the managers of the firms in our study,
we obtained data reflecting all transactions reported by insiders over the period
1974 through 1990.73 Table 9 reports the number of firms for which there was
reported insider trading activity in the indicated period and the percentage of
these observations that were net sales, that is, where total sales minus total
purchases is positive. These data show that in the pre-Act sample there were
41 firms that had insider trades more than three years before filing. The data
also show that in this period, insiders were net purchasers of their firms' shares
(i.e., since only 34.15% of the observations were net sales, 65.85% were net
purchases). During the same period in the post-Act environment, corporate
insiders were net sellers. In fact, the data show that in the post-Act environ-
ment, insiders were net sellers in all of the reported time intervals. In the year
preceding the filing of a bankruptcy petition, insiders in both time periods were
significant net sellers of their firm's shares. However, only in the post-Act
period are insiders significant net sellers in the year after filing.
73. Company insiders (officers, directors, and 10% stockholders) are required by Section 16(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988), to report to the Securities and Exchange
Commission their purchases and sales of company stock. These reports are compiled by the Commission
and are available on computer tape in machine-readable form. We thank Professor Nejat Seyhun of The
University of Michigan for providing us with the computer software to read the tape furnished by the
Commission.
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TABLE 9. Insider Trading Activity in Firms Filing Bankruptcy Petitions
[Reported are the number of firms for which there was insider trading activity
in the indicated period, and the percentages of these observations that were
Net Sales. Firms (managers) are classified as Net Sellers if Total Sales - Total
Purchases > 0. Data cover transactions from 1974 through 1990 only.]
TRADING INTMERVAL PRE-ACr Posr-Acr DIFmNcE T-STATIsTIC

















*Significantly different from 50.00
The greater propensity of insiders to dispose of their stock in the post-Act
period is better seen in Table 10. There we calculate the net volume (purchases
minus sales) for each firm in our sample. We then aggregate these net volume
figures for the pre- and post-Act subsamples.
TABLE 10. Net Volume (Purchases - Sales) of Insider Trading Activity in
Firms Filing Bankruptcy Petitions
[In order to reduce the effect of outliers, the two largest and the two smallest
values in each subsample have been eliminated from the analysis.]

























*Significantly different from 0
Once again, the data show that in both sub-periods insiders were net sellers
in the year preceding a bankruptcy filing. However, in the year before filing,
the volume of net sales is more than twenty-five times greater in the post-Act
period, and in the year following filing insiders were, in fact, net purchasers
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in the pre-Act period and significant net sellers in the latter period. These data
clearly suggest that managers correctly understand the effect of a bankruptcy
filing on the value of the firm's equity in the post-Act environment and take
appropriate actions with respect to their own holdings.
H. The Survival Rate of Firms Filing Bankruptcy Petitions
One benefit that managers may have derived from the 1978 Act is the
ability to prolong the life of the firm and extend their tenure as executives.
Presumably, the longer managers can retain control of their firm, the greater
the wealth they can extract from the firm's stakeholders. The data in Table 11
provide some weak evidence that the Act has in fact extended the tenure of
corporate executives.74
In Table 11 we report the number of firms that remain in operation follow-
ing the filing of a bankruptcy petition. In the pre-Act environment, 74.5% of
filing firms were in operation two years after filing. In contrast, 83.3% of firms
filing in the post-Act period were still operating after two years. Managers have
presumably benefited from this increase in the survival rate of filing firms.
The data in Table 11 also indicate that the percentages of firms still
operating four years after filing are not materially different in the two periods.
This suggests that the higher survival rate in the latter period is short-lived.
These data also indicate that the Act has not produced a significantly higher
"success" rate in reorganizing firms that file bankruptcy petitions. Rather, it
appears that the Act has only postponed the inevitable demise of many firms
that file bankruptcy petitions.75
TABLE 11. The Survivorship of Firms Filing Voluntary Bankruptcy Petitions
IN OPERATION
TWO YEARS FOUR YEARS
FILINGS AFER FILING AFrE FILING
Pre-Act 157 117 (74.5%) 93 (59.2%)
Post-Act 162 135 (83.3%) 100 (61.7%)
74. The main sources for the data in Table 11 are Standard & Poor's Register of Directors and
Executives, Moody's Industrial Manual, and The Wall Street Journal Index. Firms excluded by all three
of these publications at a particular time were considered to no longer be in operation.
75. See also Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 319, 322 (1991)
("[Alt best only one-fourth of companies that file chapter 11 ever emerge from bankruptcy."); E. Flynn,
Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11, at 10-11 (1989) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, on file with authors) (estimating that for Chapter 11 cases filed after
1987, no more than 30% will result in confirmed reorganization plans and that, for cases filed prior to 1987,
only 17% had resulted in confirmed plans as of July 1989).
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I. Summary and Interpretation of Empirical Results
In this part we have examined the empirical effects of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. Our findings indicate that there has been an overwhelming
increase in the number of bankruptcy filings since this legislation became
effective. Moreover, we find that this phenomenon cannot be attributed to a
weakening of the economy or an increase in the number of financially troubled
corporations. The financial condition of the typical firm filing a bankruptcy
petition in the post-Act environment is significantly stronger than that of the
typical firm filing before the Act. We conclude that under the Act, managerial
discretion is more significant, and poor financial performance less significant,
in determining whether a firm is likely to seek bankruptcy protection. Finally,
we find that the probability of being delisted before a bankruptcy filing is three
times greater in the pre-Act period. This is further evidence that the decision
to file a bankruptcy petition has become more endogenous under the 1978 Act.
Our empirical results suggest that corporate security holders have not
benefited from the provisions of the 1978 Act. Prior to the Act, stockholders
of firms that filed bankruptcy petitions typically lost fifty cents on the dollar,
risk-adjusted. Under the Act, stockholders lose almost all of their investments.
This is a surprising finding, if a principal purpose of the Act was to preserve
corporate assets by more effectively preventing the liquidation of economically
viable corporations.
As might be expected, the Act has not helped corporate bondholders either.
The default premium-the difference between the yield to Baa-rated corporate
bonds and the yield to United States Treasury bonds-is almost a third greater
in the post-Act period, reflecting the higher probability of a bankruptcy filing
and the greater bondholder losses that are likely should one occur. The Abnor-
mal Returns to bondholders from twelve months before to six months after
filing are significantly lower in the later period than previously.
The fact that both stockholders and bondholders have suffered under the
1978 Act leads us to conjecture that the Act's principal beneficiaries have been
corporate managers. We believe that Chapter 11 has increased the latitude of
corporate managers to abridge contracts and effectively breach their duties (be
they fiduciary or contractual) to security holders while their firms are in
reorganization. Chapter 11 allows, indeed encourages, managers to place their
interests ahead of the interests of their security holders and to take actions that
they could not take without court protection from creditor scrutiny. The 1978
Act thus provides managers with what amounts to a kind of defensive tactic
against corporate debtholders. Filing a Chapter 11 petition, in effect, is a way
to keep control of the firm free from the intrusive monitoring of creditors,76
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. 111990) (providing for automatic stay of creditor claims).
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thereby permitting management to extract wealth from the firm's various
security holders. 77
Recall that in our discussion of the Chapter 11 dilemma, in Part I, we
noted that judicial intervention in the affairs of a financially troubled firm
seems appropriate only if there are significant inefficiencies in the relevant
markets for labor, capital, information, and corporate control.78 Our empirical
findings indicate that a greater reliance on court-supervised reorganizations
under the 1978 Act has not resulted in the preservation of valuable corporate
assets. Rather, in view of our findings, it would appear, as noted above, that
the Chapter 11 process effectively renders ambiguous the claims of corporate
security holders, thereby allowing managers to abridge contractual agreements
and violate their fiduciary duties. We believe, however, that one can fashion
a proposal for reforming the law of corporate bankruptcy that would facilitate
the preservation of valuable corporate assets by building on the perfect markets
solution to the Chapter 11 dilemma.79 We conclude by presenting such a proposal.s'
77. See supra Part ILB. Professor Gilson reports that on average only 46% of incumbent directors
remain in office following a bankruptcy or debt restructuring, and concludes that corporate default leads
to significant change in the allocation of control rights over corporate assets. Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy,
Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 L FIN. ECON. 355 (1990). While Gilson's findings appear at first blush
to contradict our theory, we would argue that what matters is not the particular identity of the managers
running the firm in bankruptcy reorganization, but rather the latitude (and incentive) these managers have
under Chapter I1 to pursue suboptimal strategies. As we argue in Part II, the principal deficiency of the
existing law of corporate bankTuptcy is that it leaves corporate control for some period in the hands of actors
who do not suffer the economic consequences of their actions. Professor Gilson's findings do not suggest
otherwise.
Judge Easterbrook has argued, contrary to our claim, that corporate bankruptcy is efficient Frank H.
Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 411 (1990). He argues that corporate
bankruptcy law survives as an "[enduring legal institution," and that such institutions "endure either because
they are efficient or because they redistribute wealth to concentrated, politically effective interest groups."
Id. at 413. Finding no redistributive effect, Judge Easterbrook asserts that efficiency is the likely explanation
for the survival of the current bankruptcy regime. Id. at 413-14. In this part, however, we have documented
that wealth transfers from stockholders and bondholders occur under Chapter 11, thereby challenging Judge
Easterbrook's efficiency claim.
78. See discussion supra Part ILC.
79. See supra Part ILC.
80. The ideal experiment for testing our hypotheses (and the desirability of the reform we propose)
would be simply to repeal Chapter 11 and observe the resulting impact on the wealth of corporate stake-
holders. Since that experiment is obviously unavailable, however, we are forced to devise other empirical
tests of our claims. In view of the changes in the law of bankruptcy reorganization effected by the 1978
Act, one way to gauge the costs and benefits of court-supervised corporate reorganizations is to examine
the economic effects of the Act. By studying empirical findings from corporate bankruptcies before and
after the effective date of the Act, one can indirectly infer what the impact of repealing Chapter 11 might
be.
Clearly, however, our tests are imperfect since they merely compare the experiences of stockholders
and bondholders under Chapter 11 with earlier experiences under old Chapters X and XI. Strictly speaking,
therefore, our data support repeal of Chapter 11 in favor of the previous Chandler Act regime, but not
necessarily outright abolition of court-supervised corporate reorganization. In our view, however, reinstate-
ment of the Chandler Act would be only a second-best solution; our economic analysis in Part II strongly
suggests that the best solution would be to eliminate corporate bankruptcy reorganization entirely, in favor
of our proposal.
Our data, of course, are also limited to public corporations. We therefore make no empirical case
against Chapter 11 insofar as it applies to nonpublic corporations, nor could we make such a case given
the impossibility of measuring privately-held corporate claims. Thus, one might conclude that our proposal
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A. Overview
In Part I, we argued that under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
corporate bankruptcy is appropriately viewed as an increasingly endogenous
event. In Part II, we suggested that existing bankruptcy rules encourage corpo-
rate managers to reorganize under Chapter 11 when liquidation might make
more sense economically, thus generating significant bankruptcy and near-
default costs. Judicially-supervised corporate reorganization imposes on society
the expense of compensating those responsible for reorganization plans (judges,
lawyers, accountants, and financial advisers) and more than likely produces
plans that seriously undermine allocative efficiency. Part III offered empirical
evidence supporting our arguments.
While others have made similar observations,8 1 nobody has yet embraced
what we regard as the logical conclusion to which these observations and our
claim regarding the increased endogeneity of the Chapter 11 decision lead:
Chapter 11 should be repealed, abolishing court-supervised corporate reorgani-
zations and, in effect, precluding residual claimants from participating in any
reorganization of the firm. More technically, we propose a federal law repealing
Chapter 11 (insofar as it applies to corporate reorganizations) and providing
for automatic cancellation of residual claims in the event of default. This law
would leave the relative rankings of claims and the definition of default to
contracts (including provisions in the company's charter specifying the rights
and priorities of its capital stock) between the company and its claimholders.
This repeal of Chapter 11 would permit corporate claimants to enforce these
contracts strictly in the event of default, since the law would no longer provide
for a stay of enforcement actions in that event.82 We would expect companies
and their claimants to tailor their agreements to this world of strictly enforce-
able, default-contingent contracts. As we elaborate later, the likely result would
to abolish court-supervised corporate reorganization should be limited to public companies, especially since
the separation of ownership from control that characterizes public companies is often absent (or at least less
pronounced) in private firms.
Nevertheless, our theoretical analysis of corporate reorganization, particularly our discussion of
management-creditor conflicts, arguably applies with equal force to private companies. See supra Part lB.
Even if management-shareholder interests may be more closely aligned in such companies, it would therefore
appear that private company managers, like their public company counterparts, can operate in Chapter I 1
without the creditor scrutiny that would otherwise constrain their freedom to pursue suboptimal strategies.
See supra text accompanying note 29. In our view, consequently, the challenge to those who would limit
our proposal to public companies is to demonstrate why one should conclude that data on private companies,
if available, would differ significantly from the results we report. See also infra note 87 (discussing
assumption of capital market efficiency).
81. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 11; Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, supra note 11; Roe, supra
note 11.
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
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be contracts that differ significantly from those written under the current legal
regime."3
In this part, we describe a model based on our proposal to repeal Chapter
11 and discuss how managers and corporate claimholders might be expected
to adapt their behavior to a world without corporate bankruptcy reorganization.
B. A Proposed Model for a World Without Corporate Bankruptcy
Reorganization
Consider a firm with three classes of securities outstanding: senior debt,
junior debt, and common equity. The terms of the securities stipulate that in
the event of liquidation, absolute priority will be maintained in that senior
creditors will be paid in full before junior creditors receive anything. Likewise,
the firm's junior creditors must be paid in full before equity holders receive
any payment.
For reasons explained below, we assume that when the two debt instru-
ments were created, each class received what we term "contingent equity
shares." For example, if the senior debt issue had been one million dollars, then
the firm would have issued one million contingent equity shares and distributed
them to each of the senior bondholders in proportion to their respective pur-
chases of senior debt. Similarly, we assume that the firm separately issued a
second class of contingent equity shares to the junior creditors in proportion
to their respective holdings of junior debt.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a two-period model in which both
debt issues mature in the next period. We also assume that the firm's ongoing
investment/production strategy is fixed and will come to fruition next period.
Thus, at the end of the next period, the firm's output and assets will be sold
(liquidated), and the firm's security holders will be paid in accordance with
absolute priority.
Finally, we assume that in the current period, the firm owes senior creditors
an interest payment of $I. Under existing law, the firm's managers have the
option of defaulting on the firm's promise to pay senior creditors and seeking
court-supervised reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. As
discussed above,8 management may have powerful incentives to choose the
Chapter 11 option. Under our proposal, however, if the firm defaults rather than
pay the $1 owed to senior creditors, the equity holders will relinquish their
status as residual claimants and therefore lose all claims to the firm's assets,
including the next period's net cash flow.'5
83. See infra notes 94, 98; text accompanying infra note 95; infra Part N.C.
84. See supra Part II.
85. Since our proposal would abolish court-supervised reorganization, management would no longer
be able to remain in control of a firm's assets without answering to the firm's residual claimants. Thus, while
management of the debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11 is effectively responsible to the bankruptcy court,
our proposal would preserve management's responsibility to the residual claimants (typically the equity
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The immediate problem confronting management under our proposal is to
determine the value of the firm's equity. Modem finance theory offers a number
of techniques for valuing the equity position in a leveraged firm. Perhaps the
most elegant derives from the original option pricing model developed by Black
and Scholes.86 We employ a variant of their analysis here.
We assume, again in the interest of simplicity, that investors are risk-
neutral. We also ignore the time value of money and assume that, based on its
current investment/production strategy, the firm has a discrete, random, terminal
value of at least zero (as a consequence of limited liability) and a known
maximum potential value. Finally, we assume that market participants become
aware of the full extent of the distribution of possible firm values in the current
period. Under these conditions, and assuming the equity holders pay $1, the
market value of their equity can be written as:
E = E [V-(Bs+Bj)]*P(V) (7)
where
E = market value of the firm's equity after $I has been paid to the
senior bondholders
V = terminal value of the firm
V = highest possible terminal value of the firm
Bs  = amount promised the senior bondholders in the terminal period
Bj = amount promised the junior bondholders in the terminal period
Bs+Bj' = smallest terminal value of the firm that satisfies the condition
V > Bs+B j
P(V) = discrete probability distribution of the terminal value of the
firm
Equation (7) reflects our stipulated rule of absolute priority in that equity
holders receive payment only if the terminal value of the firm exceeds the
aggregate amount owed to the junior and senior debtholders, i.e., V > [Bs +
B.]. Note that E will be positive as long as V*, the maximum possible terminal
value of the firm, is greater than the aggregate amount promised creditors (Bs
+ B.). We refer to E as the value of the equity holders' residual claim.
holders) who elect them. We therefore assume throughout this discussion that, under our proposal,
management would generally act on behalf of the firm's residual claimants. Accordingly, in this part we
sometimes discuss the incentives of managers and residual claimants interchangeably, recognizing that our
model would permit residual claimants to replace management at any time.
This feature of our proposal-a realignment of management's incentives that ensures that those in
control of the firm would suffer the consequences and enjoy the benefits of their decisions-is centrally
important for achieving more efficient resource allocations, since it would effectively reassign the right to
control those resources to those with the strongest incentive to accomplish such allocations.
86. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 . POL.
ECON. 637 (1973).
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Assuming an efficient capital market,87 it follows that the f'rm's managers
can and will issue additional equity to pay the senior creditors if E > L Alterna-
tively, if E <I, the managers will default, and under our proposal the equity
holders will relinquish all claims to the terminal value of the firm.
It is important to recognize that under current law, as long as there is a
positive probability that the terminal value of the firm will exceed I + Bs + Bj,
management has an incentive to invoke Chapter 11 protection to defer payment
on the $1 owed to the firm's senior creditors in the current period. Indeed, as
we argued in Part II, the firm has an incentive to secure court protection and
to alter its investment/production decisions to insure a positive probability that
the fnm's terminal value will exceed the aggregate amount owed creditors.
(And to the extent that bankruptcy courts generally scale back creditor claims,
the incentive to seek such protection is even greater.)
In effect, the managers (whom we assume to be acting on behalf of the
company's equity holders08 ) of a leveraged firm have an "option" to pay the
firm's senior creditors today for a residual claim to the firm's terminal value.
The managers will "exercise" 9 this option only if the present value of the
residual claim exceeds the amount owed to the firn's senior creditors in the
87. That is, one in which all market participants are fully aware of the distribution of terminal values
and the amount promised the firm's creditors. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 . FIN. 383 (1970); Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: 11, 46 L FIN.
1575 (1991).
We also assume, relatedly, an active market for the residual claims to a firm's assets. In view of these
assumptions, some would argue that our proposal is necessarily limited to relatively large, publicly-held
companies. Given that such companies control a disproportionately vast percentage of all corporate resources,
so limiting our proposal would hardly diminish its significance as a source of improved efficiency.
Nevertheless, we believe that our proposal need not be so limited. First, it has become clear in recent years
that smaller (and even privately-held) bankrupt companies are closely followed by increasing numbers of
highly sophisticated investors. There is an active market for the securities of firms in bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion, and so-called "bottom fishers" such as R.D. Smith & Company, Feshbach Brothers and Whitman
Heffernan Rhein & Co., Inc. have made millions of dollars in that market. See lack Egan, Fishing for Good
Deals, U.S. NEWS & WORID REP., Sept. 24, 1990, at 82; John Egan, Powerless, FIN. WORLD, Mar. 19,
1991, at 41; Christopher Farrell, The Vulture Capitalists are Circling, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 5, 1988, at 84;
Leo Fasciocco, The Feshback Brothers Have Some Bad News: But to Them It's Good, As Savvy Smart
Sellers Gain When Trouble Swamps a Stack, INVsTOR'S DAILY, Feb. 21, 1990, at 1; Dianna B. Henriques,
Troubled Times on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1991, at D1. In view of these developments, there would
appear to be sufficient market interest in financially distressed firms to make our proposal workable even
for companies whose residual claims are less actively traded.
Second, our proposal would spur residual claimants to furnish the market with voluminous information
regarding a firm's value, lest those claimants be ousted from control because the market incorrectly values
the firm. This response by residual claimants would arouse still greater market interest in financially troubled
firms. In other words, our proposal would itselfdramatically increase the efficiency of the securities markets
for financially troubled companies, whether or not a firm's stock is ordinarily actively traded.
Finally, it is worth noting that we also rely on the existence of a viable market for corporate control.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-38; infra note 96.
88. See supra note 85.
89. The literature of financial economics has long recognized that common equity owners are like the
owners of a call option. Just as the holder of a call option will decline to exercise the option if the exercise
price exceeds the value of the underlying security, common stockholders will "exercise" their "option" to
pay the firm's senior creditors only if that exercise makes economic sense. See Bebchuk, supra note 11,
at 780; Black & Scholes, supra note 86.
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current period ($I)."9 In terms of our model, managers will make the current
debt payment only when the following condition is satisfied:
IE (8)
Put simply, equity holders (or, more precisely, the managers who represent
them) will default unless the amount currently due (F) is less than the value of
the residual claim (E), which is equal to the expected terminal value of the firm
(V) less the amount promised creditors, as illustrated by Equation (7).
Expression (8) defines the firm's equity position. If the condition stated in
Expression (8) holds, then there is positive net equity in the firm and, assuming
an efficient capital market,91 managers could issue new equity shares to fi-
nance the debt payments that are currently due. If Expression (8) does not hold,
then there is no equity in the firm, and managers could not sell new equity to
finance the current debt payments since, under these circumstances, no investor
would pay a positive price for an additional residual claim to the firm's termi-
nal value. The firm would therefore default on its senior debt obligation as a
result of the market's assessment that there is no longer a net equity position
in the firm. Thus, under our proposal the market rather than a bankruptcy court
would determine whether there is a net equity position in the firm.
Suppose that the firm's management is unable to sell new equity in the
market. Under such circumstances, management will have no choice but to
default on its obligation to senior creditors, in which case the common stock-
holders will lose all claims to the firm's assets; for all intents and purposes,
the firm's equity securities will "evaporate."
Under our proposal, the firm's junior debt will also "evaporate" in the
event of default. In its place, the contingent equity owned by the junior debt-
holders will be "transformed" into the firm's new common equity securities.
Put differently, default will oust the firm's equity holders from their position
as residual claimants to the firm's cash flows and, in effect, substitute the junior
debtholders as the new common stockholders.
The firm's junior bondholders would now face the problem of valuing the
firm's new equity claims. Using the same analysis we offered above, if the
original equity holders do not default on the promised payments to senior
creditors, the value of the junior debt (Dj) can be written as:
90. For this "option" analogy, we may think of E (the value of the equity holders' residual claim) as
the expected payoff upon exercise of the option and I (the amount owed to senior creditors in the current
period) as the cost of the option. The option "exercise price" is the sum B. + Bj.
91. See supra note 87.
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Dj = E (V-Bs).P( + E Bj*P() (9)
v-B; V.B,.B;
Equation (9) reflects the absolute priority established by the firm's capital
structure. For terminal values less than or equal to the amount owed senior
creditors (Bs), the junior bondholders receive nothing. As reflected in the first
expression in Equation (9), for terminal values between the amount owed the
senior bondholders and the sum of that amount and the payment due junior
bondholders, junior bondholders receive the value of the firm less the payment
to senior bondholders. The second expression in Equation (9) captures the
notion that for terminal values in excess of Bs + Bj, the junior bondholders
receive only their promised amount.
Should default occur, the value of the junior bondholders' claim to the




= Z (V-B*P(V) + E (V-Bs*P(V)
V-BI :IB
The net value of the junior bondholders' position, of course, is !Yj - I, where
I is the amount owed senior creditors in the current period. Like the equity
holders before them, junior creditors maintain their claims to the firm's terminal
value only if they pay senior creditors $1 today.92
The increase in the value of the junior creditors' residual claim to the firm's
terminal value is reflected by the difference in the second terms in each of
Equations (9) and (10). As junior bondholders, the maximum terminal payoff
they could receive would be B.. (See Equation (9).) As the firm's new residual
claimants, however, the old junior bondholders may receive as much as V* -
Bs. (See Equation (10).) For terminal values in excess of Bs + Bj, it clearly
follows that (V - Bs) > B. 93
Once the firm's junior debtholders effectively become the firm's new
residual claimants, they will face the same choice that confronted the old
common stockholders: they must either pay the obligation owed to the firm's
92. And again, in terms of our "option" analogy, see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text, I is
the cost of the option held by the new residual claimants (the old junior bondholders) and D; in Equation
(10) is the expected payoff on exercise of the option.
93. While D; is strictly greater than D,, the difference between the two will always be less than the
liability assumed by the junior bondholders upon default by the equity holders; the junior bondholders cannot
retain the residual claim to the firm's terminal value without first paying senior creditors the amount
currently due them. Thus, default by the equity holders will not make the junior bondholders better off.
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senior creditors or default. Once again, the choice between these two alterna-
tives will be made by capital market participants rather than by the new residual
claimants, since financing a payment to the senior creditors will require the
issuance of new equity securities.
We can generalize our model to contemplate a capital structure with several
classes of securities outstanding, each with its own contingent equity shares.94
Under this system, when debt payments come due, management has the option
of making the payment or defaulting. If the firm defaults, then the existing
residual claimants give up all claims to the terminal value of the firm. Their
claims would be extinguished and their residual claim status would pass to the
next-higher priority security class. The contingent equity shares, for which we
would expect claimholders to contract,95 would provide the mechanism by
which this transfer of residual claim status would be accomplished.
This process of "passing" common equity rights "up through" the priority
of the firm's securities would continue until one of two things happens: either
the rights are passed up to the firm's senior creditors, or a class of security
holders with lower priority is able to issue sufficient new equity to meet the
obligations owed to the senior creditors. If the former event occurs, then the
firm's senior creditors have the choice of running the firm and retaining the
firm's equity position, selling its equity position to "outside" investors, or
liquidating the firm's assets. If they chose either the second or third alternative,
they would be paid and the equity position of the firm would be retained by
the class of security holders who make the payment.96
Recall that in our discrete-time model, we assume that the distribution of
terminal values becomes known to market participants at the beginning of the
current period. Based on this distribution, the firm's equity holders, and then
its junior bondholders, can assess the value of their claims. However, our
development of the model suggests, artificially, a step-by-step process for these
value assessments, starting with the firm's equity holders and moving up the
94. We anticipate under our proposal that contingent equity shares could also be issued to trade
creditors, who of course enjoy the lowest priority among the firm's creditors.
For ease of analysis, we have assumed a highly simplified capital structure. In the real world, a firm's
capital structure is often considerably more complicated, and determining the relative rights and priorities
of the firm's claimants may be more daunting than our discussion suggests. A critical feature of our
proposal, however, is that each creditor would be able to bind the firm to strictly enforceable default-
contingent contracts. See supra text accompanying note 82. Creditors would therefore have a strong incentive
to negotiate contracts that would precisely clarify their respective rights and priorities and grant to each of
them appropriate contingent equity shares. Creditors, fully aware of the consequences of their bargains,
would thereby rank themselves inter se, however complicated the firm's capitalization. See also infra note
98.
95. See supra note 94.
96. We need not specify whether the firm's original managers would continue to run the firm
throughout this entire process. As soon as the contingent equity claims of a class are transformed into
common equity, that class can install any management team it chooses. Our proposal therefore encourages
participants in the market for corporate control to participate in the "reorganization" process as welL See
supra notes 37, 87. Nothing in our proposal prohibits a bidder from making a tender offer for the firm's
equity (or debt, for that matter) at any stage of the process.
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priority structure of the firm's securities. In reality, of course, this process
would be continuous. Thus, at every point in time, capital market agents would
be evaluating the firm's securities in light of the promised payments and the
distribution of terminal values. Market participants would continually assess
the firm's need and ability to issue new shares to meet its debt obligations. If
it became apparent that the firm (i.e., its equity holders) might not be able to
issue new equity, the value of the existing equity would fall, as would the value
of the firm's outstanding debt securities. The value of the contingent equity
shares held by the junior bondholders, however, would rise, in anticipation of
the equity holders' potential default.
An important feature of our proposal, distinct from others, is that it com-
pletely avoids judicial intervention.97 Under our proposal, there would be no
"day of reckoning" and no need for a court-supervised sale or recapitalization
of the firm. Rather, as the market learned more about the distribution of
terminal values, the values of the firm's securities and its contingent securities
would adjust accordingly. Thus, the elimination of the firm's equity holders and
the erosion of their holdings would be a slow, orderly process. 98
In addition, our proposal would ensure adherence to the rule of absolute
priority by precluding payments to junior claimants when senior claims are not
fully paid. This would eliminate uncertainties currently associated with the
reorganization process99 and thereby increase the utility of risk-averse inves-
tors, who would be willing to pay a premium for the certainty afforded by strict
application of the absolute priority rule."to
Our proposal would plainly reduce the inefficiencies associated with court-
supervised corporate reorganizations.10' Most notably, the incentive that man-
97. Of course, the courts would retain their traditional role of enforcing property rights and contracts.
98. Because of this feature, our proposal would also obviate the need for an automatic stay, a feature
of the existing Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)-(b) (1988). Thus, under our proposal there would
be little, if any, concern that nervous creditors would race one another to the courthouse in order to convert
their claims into priority judgments against a firm on the verge of "failure." See supra note 94 (noting
treatment of trade creditors under our proposal). Put differently, while creditors would retain their state law
rights to sue a corporate debtor in state court, see supra note 97, under our proposal we would expect
creditor contracts to reflect both the enforceability of default-contingent provisions and the legal rule
canceling the current residual claims, thereby effectively passing corporate control "up the priority ladder"
upon default. As a consequence, such contracts would precisely define the relative rights and priorities of
a firm's creditors. In such a world, creditors would have little to gain from a race to the courthouse.
It is also worth noting that our proposal would in no way preclude debt restructurings prior to default.
See generally Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private
Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315 (1990). Thus, although our proposal would
significantly improve the bargaining position of creditors in such restructurings, managers would be free
to renegotiate a firm's outstanding debt obligations.
99. See supra note 13.
100. Security holders know that absolute priority may be violated in a Chapter I1 reorganization, but
they cannot predict precisely the extent of such violations. Price protection against the potential loss from
a bankruptcy filing is therefore incomplete.
101. We leave to one side the question whether operation of the firm under an independent trustee's
control might also accomplish this result. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1988) (authorizing Chapter 7 trustee to
operate business for a "limited period").
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agers have under existing law to abandon value-maximizing operating strategies
and generate near-default costs would be eliminated, since the common equity
holders would be ousted from control of the firm immediately upon the firm's
default on its obligation to pay senior creditors. In addition, the costs of
reorganization itself (i.e., judicial resources and legal, accounting, and financial
advisory fees) obviously would be avoided.1"
C. The Problem of Near-Default Costs
We should discuss, at least briefly, one possible objection to our proposal.
While we claim that repeal of Chapter 11 would drastically reduce near-default
costs, some might argue that the impact would be precisely the opposite, since
disabling equity holders from participating in court-supervised reorganizations
could induce managers to abandon optimal operating strategies (thereby generat-
ing near-default costs) well before any debt payment is actually due. (Indeed,
a conventional justification for court-supervised reorganizations is that they
reduce management's incentive to run the firm into the ground before default.)
Relatedly, in describing our proposal we have assumed implicitly that managers
have only one available strategy for raising the funds needed to pay senior debt
obligations: the issuance of new equity. What our proposal omits, of course,
is any mechanism whereby managers would be forced to raise funds through
equity sales rather than through other undertakings, such as asset sales, risky
(negative net present value) projects, and the like. To the extent that managers
are free to select fundraising methods other than resort to the equity market,
our proposal is problematic; managers might have an increased incentive to
undertake suboptimal projects as the firm nears the default that, under our
proposal, would extinguish the equity holders' claims against the company's
102. Some might criticize us for proposing to repeal Chapter 11 without completely addressing all of
its asserted justifications. While extensive analysis of all of the purported benefits of court-supervised
corporate bankruptcy reorganization is beyond the scope of this Article, we note that others have analyzed
those benefits and concluded that the case for Chapter I1 is tenuous at best. Professor Bowers, for example,
argues that Chapter 11 is unnecessary in view of the efficiency of state collection law. James W. Bowers,
Whither What Hits the Fan? Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Loss
Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 1992). Professor Picker, attacking the standard justification
of bankruptcy reorganization law as a solution to a"common pooi" problem among creditors, shows through
game theory that the problem is better solved by adroit use of security interests. Randall Picker, Security
Interests, Misbehavior, and the Common Pool, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 1992). Similarly,
Professor Adler critically examines conventional justifications for Chapter 11 and concludes that there is
simply no need for a law of corporate bankruptcy reorganization. Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk
Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 1992); see also JACKSON, supra note 11, ch. 9
(criticizing justifications for retaining Chapter 11); Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note II; James W. Bowers,
Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics
of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990) (arguing that bankruptcy does not necessarily produce optimal
liquidations).
In view of the work of these scholars and the theoretical and empirical analyses that we offer, one
can question whether there is any persuasive theory justifying Chapter 11 insofar as corporate bankruptcies
are concerned. It seems to us that, at the very least, proponents of Chapter 11 ought to bear the burden of
proving that it does more good than harm.
1086 [Vol. 101: 1043
Chapter 11
assets. In view of these considerations, one might legitimately ask whether our
proposal simply illustrates an inevitable trade-off between improving the
bankruptcy system's allocative efficiency and reducing near-default costs."°
In other words, would our proposal not only ignore, but perhaps even exacer-
bate, the problem of near-default costs?
We believe, upon reflection, that the increase in near-default costs that
might be occasioned by our proposal is more apparent than real and that, as
a consequence, there is no inevitable trade-off between improving allocative
efficiency and reducing near-default costs. More specifically, we imagine that
a market solution to this potential problem would evolve were our proposal
adopted. If, as we propose, court-supervised reorganizations were outlawed and
the law provided for cancellation of a firm's equity claims once a debt payment
were missed, we would expect creditors to bargain for covenants pursuant to
which debt obligations would be payable only from certain sources, and drastic
changes in the firm's operating strategy would require creditor approval. These
covenants almost certainly would be sufficiently restrictive to preclude a
company from financing debt payments through extraordinary asset sales or
other similar transactions. For example, creditors might well demand contractual
provisions precluding the payment of debt obligations from sources other than
current cash flows or the proceeds of equity sales. 10 Such covenants would
effectively restrict management's freedom, thereby limiting the near-default
costs that could arise under our proposal. Moreover, although existing law
permits bankrupt firms to reject their contractual obligations, including those
contained in bond covenants, such an alternative would not be available to
managers under our proposal. Thus, debtholders could strictly enforce the
covenants that we imagine would prevent managers from generating near-
default costs.105
Recent developments in the credit markets strongly suggest that creditors
are perfectly capable of bargaining for such protections. For example, to address
creditor concerns that certain events can adversely affect outstanding corporate
debt, companies have begun to include in their bond covenants event risk
provisions that permit bondholders to demand repurchase of their bonds upon
the occurrence of certain events, such as a downgrading of the company's debt
103. See White, supra note 11, at 149.
104. See, e.g., Smith & Warner, supra note 28, at 131 (describing the use of bond covenants for other
purposes, such as restricting the payment of dividends).
105. See also Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir.)
(suggesting that managers may owe fiduciary duties to bondholders), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982);
Andrew E. Bogen et al., Landmark on an Unmapped Terrain: Defining the Rights of Debtholders, INstiHTs,
Jan. 1991, at 19 (same); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413,
442-50 (1986) (pointing to emerging common law of bondholder protection); Lawrence Mitchell, The
FairnessRights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L REV. 1165 (1990) (arguing that bondholders should
be afforded rights analogous to those afforded stockholders).
1992] 1087
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 101: 1043
rating.' °6 In a world without corporate bankruptcy reorganization, one could
expect creditors to demand such provisions with even greater urgency; the
flexibility of corporate managers would, as a result, be severely limited. 7
V. CONCLUSION
We have argued that under the 1978 Act the corporate bankruptcy decision
is increasingly endogenous, and that operation or reorganization of a company
under court supervision permits managers to effect wealth transfers through the
pursuit of suboptimal strategies, thereby generating net social costs. Managers,
we have argued, effectively invoke Chapter 11 as a defense against unwelcome
interference by creditors and as a mechanism for extracting significant wealth
from the firm's various security holders. We have also presented empirical
evidence supporting our claims.
Having suggested a theoretical analysis that reveals no economic benefits
from court-supervised corporate reorganizations, and having identified the
significant social costs that such reorganizations engender,108 we conclude that
106. As of May 1990, more than 80 companies had adopted such provisions. See Richard A.
Steinwurtzel & Janice L. Gardner, Event Risk Update: Credit Sensitive Securities, M&A & CORP. GOVER-
NANCE LAW REP., May 1990, at 456; see also Joy Begley, Debt Covenants and Accounting Choice, 12 J.
AcCr. & ECON. 125 (1990) (discussing the difficulties in using leverage ratios as approximations for actual
debt covenants); Leland Crabbe, EventRisk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders and "Super Poison Put"
Bond Covenants, 46 J. FIN. 689, 689 (1991) (reporting that 40% of recently issued investment-grade
industrial bonds have specialized event risk covenants); Joanne C. Duke & Herbert G. Hunt, III An Empiri-
cal Examination of Debt Covenant Restrictions and Accounting-RelatedDebt Proxies, 12 J. Acr. & ECON.
45 (1990) (noting examples of debt covenants in relation to the debt-equity ratio); Eric G. Press & Joseph
B. Weintrop, Accounting-Based Constraints in Public and Private Debt Agreements, 12 J. AcCr. & ECON.
65 (1990) (discussing the relation of debt agreements to leverage); Norman D. Slonaker, Recent Develop-
ments in Debt Securities, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND TEcHNIQUEs 1990, at 7 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 678, 1990) (discussing development and use of debt covenants);
Richard A. Steinwurtzel & Janice L Gardner, Super Poison Puts as a Protection Against Event Risks,
INSIGHTS, Oct. 1989, at 3 (describing event risk bond covenants); Richard Brook, Debt Covenants and Event
Risk. The Practitioner as a Source of Evidence (Oct. 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
(discussing corporate bond covenants); cf. Paul Asquith & Thierry A. Wizman, Event Risk. Covenants and
BondholderReturns in LeveragedBuyouts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (1990) (reporting that prebuyout bondhold-
ers, on average, suffer significant wealth losses in leveraged buyouts, while bonds with strong covenant
protection gain value).
107. While we are confident that repeal of Chapter 11 would cause debtholders to insist on covenants
that would effectively curtail managements pursuit of risky, negative net present value projects, we are
less confident that debtholders could write and enforce covenants requiring managers to accept all positive
net present value projects. See supra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text (discussing "underinvestment"
as a source of near-default costs). Nevertheless, eliminating equity holder participation in the firm's
reorganization may pressure managers to renegotiate covenants that prevent a higher-valued allocation of
the firm's resources. Therefore, under our proposal managers may be more likely to approach debtholders
to strike a mutually advantageous bargain. At the very least, repeal of Chapter 11 would seem to pose no
threat of exacerbating the underinvestment problem.
108. As noted earlier, see supra note 44, we have not addressed the impact of either Chapter 11 or
our proposal on corporate constituencies other than stockholders and bondholders. Arguably, however, as
compared with current law our proposal would be at worst neutral, and perhaps preferable, in its effects
on these other constituencies. Thus, in view of management's demonstrable inefficiency and self-inter-
estedness under Chapter 11, see supra Parts I, El, there is little reason to believe that a distressed firm's
employees, customers, suppliers, and communities are better served by managers than by those to whom
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Chapter 11 should be repealed and replaced by the mechanism we describe for
dealing with "financially distressed" corporations. Our model would produce
more efficient allocations of the assets of such firms by effectively assigning
control of those assets to individuals having powerful incentives to achieve such
allocations. As a consequence, social welfare would be enhanced.
corporate control would devolve under our proposal. Indeed, the residual claimants who would assume
control under our proposal would arguably be more effective agents for these constituencies than would
managers, since the residual claimants would have a greater incentive to run the firm more efficiently. See
supra note 85; text accompanying note 102. Moreover, to the extent that our proposal would eliminate the
deadweight costs of bankruptcy reorganizations, see supra note 23; text accompanying note 102, troubled
firms should be financially stronger and therefore more likely to survive, which would also benefit these
other constituencies. In any event, it is by no means self-evident that the welfare of these constituencies
is an appropriate concern for the law of corporate bankruptcy. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 20-27; Baird,
A World Without Bankruptcy, supra note 11, at 183-86; Robert K. Rasmussen, Bankruptcy and the
Administrative State, 42 HASTINGS L J. 1567 (1991); Rasmussen, supra note 75, at324-25; Robert E. Scott,
Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 690, 700-07 (1986). But
see WARREN & WESTRBROOK, supra note 20, at 397-403 (arguing that corporate bankruptcy law should
concern itself with constituencies such as employees and communities); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, 54 U. CHL L REV. 775, 796 (1987) (same).
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SUPPLEMENTARY DATA APPENDIX
In this appendix, we present supporting data for certain results presented
in the text. These data relate to the frequency of bankruptcy filings, the number
of firms in our sample included in the COMPUSTAT data files, the abnormal
returns to the equity holders of filing firms, and corporate management's
reliance on debt financing under the 1978 Act.
A. The Frequency of Bankruptcy Filings
The time series of the number of United States firms filing bankruptcy
petitions between 1962 and 1989 is presented in Table A.l. The "TOTAL"
Column presents the annual number of bankruptcy filings as reported by The
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. These data represent filings
based on a July to June calendar year. For example, from July 1988 through
June 1989, there were a total of 17,447 Chapter 11 filings. (See the last entry
in the first column of Table A. 1.)




L SED FRM Mo
YEAR TOTAL BUSINESS LISTED IM FIING R
1962 903 - - 2,036 - -
1963 1,188 - - 2,069 - 27.25
1964 1,088 - 0 2,111 0 18.07
1965 1,022 - 3 2,162 0.139 18.33
1966 909 - 0 2,175 0 35.39
1967 1,033 - 3 2,194 0.137 35.55
1968 953 - 2 2,203 0.091 51.22
1969 867 - 1 2,270 0.044 - 0.77
1970 1,262 - 6 2,387 0.251 -36.00
1971 1,782 - 17 2,479 0.686 61.74
1972 1,361 - 9 2,635 0.342 12.20
1973 1,458 - 15 2,731 0.549 -27.94
1974 2,171 - 16 2,723 0.588 -5.63
1975 3,506 - 16 2,667 0.600 54.17
1976 3,235 - 22 2,621 0.839 34.28
1977 3,046 - 15 2,605 0.576 26.03
1978 3,266 - 21 2,514 0.835 32.24






















Notes Accompanying Table A.1:
YEAR: Year end June 30.
TOTAL: Total corporate bankruptcy filings as reported by the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts.
BusINEss: Total businesses filings as reported by the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts.
LIsTED: Firms that filed bankruptcy petitions and were listed on either the
NYSE or AMEX between July 1964 and December 1989.
TOTAL EXCHANGE
LisTED: Total number of firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX
% LISTED: Percentage of exchange-listed firms filing bankruptcy petitions
MARKETr: Holding period return to CRSP Equally Weighted Market Portfo-
lio.
The "TOTAL" column in Table A.1 reports filings of both business and
individual corporations. The entries in the column labeled "BUSINESS" represent
only businesses. Although these data are only available for the 1981-1989
period, it is evident that the numbers under "BUSINESS" represent a significant
and relatively constant fraction of those under the "TOTAL" heading. Over the
nine years for which both types of data are available, the business filings range
from a low of 85% to a high of 92% of all Chapter 11 filings. Based on these
findings, the number of total bankruptcy filings appears to be a good proxy for
the number of businesses filing in any given year.
The third column in Table A.1 reports the number of firms listed on either
the NYSE or AMEX over the period 1964-1989 filing bankruptcy petitions in
the indicated year. This is our basic sample. The fourth column reports the total
number of firms listed on the NYSE and the AMEX, and the fifth column
reports the percentage of exchange-listed firms that filed a bankruptcy petition
in the indicated year. The last column in Table A.1 reports the annual return
to the CRSP Equally Weighted Market Portfolio.
B. The Representation of Our Sample Firms in the COMPUSTAT File
The data in Table A.2 show the representation of our sample of bankruptcy
firms in the COMPUSTAT file. Table A.2 shows that COMPUSTAT does not
include any data on our firms for the 1960's. Thus, pre-Act/post-Act compari-
sons derived from the COMPUSTAT files are actually comparisons between
the decades of the 1970's and 1980's. Table A.2 also reveals a significantly
greater representation of firms in the post-Act period. In the earlier period, an
annual average of 43% of filing firms were listed on COMPUSTAT, while the
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annual average for the post-Act period is 77%, with the total number of firms
listed on COMPUSTAT almost doubling over the two decades.
We speculate that the COMPUSTAT files are more likely to include long-
standing, viable firms than failing companies and that, therefore, our findings
regarding the returns to firms in the pre-Act period may well overstate the
financial strength of firms filing bankruptcy petitions in that period. It seems
unlikely, in any case, that the pre-Act COMPUSTAT files are biased in the
opposite direction by including a disproportionate number of financially weak-
ened companies. Consequently, a larger pre-Act sample would arguably produce
data even more supportive of our conclusions regarding the relative financial
strength of pre-Act and post-Act bankrupt firms.
TABLE A.2. Availability of Accounting Data on COMPUSTAT for Firms
Filing Voluntary Bankruptcy Petitions
% OF ILING FMS
TOTAL FM TOTAL PLINGS ON LIm"r ON
YEAR ON COMPUSTAT PILINGS COIMSTAT COMI'osrA
C. The Abnormal Returns to the Equity Holders of Firms
Petitions
Filing Bankruptcy
Table A.3 reports the mean percentage abnormal returns to firms filing
bankruptcy petitions in each of the two relevant time periods. Eleven different
holding periods are reported in the table. Note that only traded firms are
included in each of the holding periods. As firms are delisted from the exchang-
es, they are dropped from the analysis.
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TABLE A.3. Mean Percentage Abnormal Returns to the Stockholders of
Firms Filing Bankruptcy Petitions and Traded Over The Indicated Holding
Period
[The number of firms is reported in brackets [x] and the t-statistics of the
differences are reported in parentheses (x).]
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a Holding periods are stated in trading days relative to the filing date, which is defined as day 0.
There are approximately 250 trading days in a calendar year, 20 trading days in a calendar month,
and 5 trading days in a calendar week.
Holding periods are stated in terms of trading days relative to the filing date
and roughly correspond to the following calendar periods. The first two holding
periods (-1000 to -876) and (-875 to -751) correspond to event year -4. The
next two holding periods (-750 to -626) and (-625 to -501) cover event year - 3.
The fifth holding period (-500 to -251) is from two years before to one year
before the filing date. The sixth (-250 to -121) is from one year before to six
months before filing. The seventh (-120 to -21) is from six months to one
month before filing. The eighth (-20 to -6) is from one month to one week
before filing. The ninth (-5 to 0) runs from one week before filing to the
announcement date. The tenth holding period is from one day to one month
after filing, and the last period is from one month to six months after filing.
The abnormal returns to both portfolios are negative from three years prior
to filing through the filing month. More important, in eight of the nine pre-
filing periods, the AR is less for firms filing in the post-Act environment. In
four of these eight time periods, the difference is statistically significant.
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Although the AR is less negative for all pre-filing periods prior to 1980, the
AR around the time of announcement (-5 to 0) is less than the AR for firms
in the same holding period post-Act. These results indicate that the filing of
a bankruptcy petition was a greater surprise in the earlier period than in the
later period. Note also that there is no significant change in the value of the
firms in either sample after the filing date. The lack of any significant move-
ment in the post-announcement holding periods is consistent with an efficient
capital market, confirming the accuracy of the filing dates used in the sample.
D. The Mean Debt-to-Asset Ratios of Firms Filing Bankruptcy Petitions
Table A.4 presents the mean (long-term) debt-to-asset ratios for firms filing
bankruptcy petitions. The data are reported separately for the pre-Act and post-
Act periods. The debt-to-asset ratio for each firm is adjusted by the (value-
weighted) average debt-to-asset ratio of all firms listed on the COMPUSTAT
file in the indicated year. Thus, we may think of these as abnormal debt-to-
asset ratios.
The differences in the means of the two sub-periods indicate significantly
higher debt-to-asset ratios in the post-Act period. The mean ratio for the latter
period is greater that the mean ratio in the pre-Act period in all five years, and
in four of the five periods, the t-statistic of the difference is greater than 2.0.
We interpret these results as evidence of management's increased willing-
ness under the Act to risk financial distress by incurring high levels of debt.
Put differently, the data indicate that the latitude afforded managers by Chapter
11 made financial distress less onerous by relaxing the constraints otherwise
imposed by a more highly leveraged capital structure.
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TABLE A.4. Debt-to-Asset Ratios of Firms Filing Bankruptcy
Petitions
[Reported is the mean, economy-wide adjusted debt-to-asset ratio (DTA) for
finms in the indicated sample.a The number of firms is reported in brackets [x]
and the t-statistics of the differences are reported in parentheses (x).]
EVENT YEAR PRE-ACr POSr-ACr DIEENCH
-5 1.74 9.46 7.72
a DTA Long-term Debt = > Long-term Debt
Total Assets E Total Assets
Z Long-term Debt
Z Total Assets
= The summation of the long-term debt for all firms listed on
the COMPUSTAT tape in the relevant year
= The summation of the total asset figures for all firms listed
on the COMPUSTAT tape in the relevant year
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